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Reforming International Institutions to
Improve Global Environmental
Relations, Agreement, and Treaty
Enforcement
By STEVEN M. ANDERSON*
Animals and plants have Owners that take care of them, just as
Sibd takes care of human beings. The Owners of plants and animals
are supernatural beings, and they are very powerful. They don't like
to see us mistreat their possessions, and in fact they punish us if we
abuse their animals and plants. That's why we have to be sure to
obey Sibd's laws. /SibOJ taught us how we should live with all things
on Earth.'
How far will modem [humankind]... set themselves to revise
their ideas, remake their institutions, and educate the coming genera-
tions ... ? How far will they remain dark, obdurate, habitual, and
traditional, resisting the convergent forces that offer them either unity
or misery? Sooner or later that unity must come or else plainly men
must perish by their own inventions....
Human history becomes more and more a race between educa-
tion and catastrophe.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Historians will reflect on the close of the second millennium as a
time of environmental enlightenment and increasing global interde-
pendence. In response to worsening ecological crises and a worldwide
push for green consciousness, national governments of both devel-
oped and lesser developed countries, international political and finan-
* Member of the Class of 1996. B.A. University of California, San Diego. 1990. I
would like to thank Jennifer and my parents and grandparents for their tremendous sup-
port. I would also like to thank Armin Rosencranz of the Pacific Energy & Resources
Center for his helpful comments on an early draft of this note.
1. GLORIA MAYORGA, TAyING CARE OF Smo's Gw-rs: AN ENVIRONMENTAL. TREA.
"rISE FROM COSTA RicA's K.KOLDi INDIGENOUS RESERVE 41 (1991).
2. H.G. WELLS, TiE OuTLNE oF HsTORY 1087, 1100 (3d ed. 1921).
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cial institutions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), local
communities, and the private sector have begun to converge in their
efforts to control waste, preserve natural resources, and reach envi-
ronmental agreement. A large measure of success has been achieved
in negotiating and reaching accord; scores of new international envi-
ronmental treaties covering an ever-widening range of subject matter
have been concluded over the last twenty-five years.
Today, the great problems burdening international environmental
law and its institutions revolve around deficiencies relating to ratifica-
tion, implementation, coordination, enforcement, and monitoring of
new and existing agreements.' The need for systemic overhaul has
increased in recent years due to the expansion in the number of indi-
vidually administered international environmental treaties and be-
cause a greater number of parties have taken roles in the treaty-
making process. Unfortunately, the progress achieved by interna-
tional environmental agreements is frequently limited by recurring
disagreements between developed countries and lesser developed
countries (LDCs) over administration, voting structure, implementa-
tion measures, and time schedules. Moreover, foot-dragging at the
domestic level by nations which advocate and negotiate significant en-
vironmental change at the global level has led to a slow-moving inter-
national environmental legal structure in which political ambivalence
breeds enforcement lethargy. In sum, treaties often appear more akin
to agreements to agree than to contractual arrangements announcing
meaningful change.
Lack of an international oversight mechanism to monitor imple-
mentation of environmental treaties is one of the central shortfalls of
the current structure.4 While many, if not all, goverinments, NGOs,
commentators, and international bodies involved in global environ-
mental politics have expressed reservations about creating any new
institutions or new bureaucracy, 5 they have also recognized that en-
3. See generally R. Keohane et al., The Effectiveness of International Environmental
Institutions, in INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH: SOURCES OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Peter M. Haas et al. eds., 1993).
4. See Andrew Watson Samaan, Note, Enforcement of International Environmental
Treaties: An Analysis, 5 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 261, 267 (1993).
5. See generally Robert W. Hahn and Kenneth R. Richards, The Internationalization
of Environmental Regulation, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 421 (1989); Edith Brown Weiss, Interna-
tional Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New World Or.
der, 81 GEo. L.J. 675 (1993); Samaan, supra note 4; Catherine Tinker, Note, Environmental
Planet Management by the United Nations: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Yet Come?, 22
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 47 (1990).
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forcement deficiencies cripple implementation of international envi-
ronmental treaties.6 World decision-makers should acknowledge that
international environmental mechanisms better suited to coordinate
and oversee efforts to preserve our common natural environment
need to be created.
The idea of establishing a permanent body to guide the strategy
for protecting the global environment is not new. Academics,
supragovernmental organizations, students, and NGOs have drafted
designs of model institutions for several decades.7 The predominant
proposal is to form a core group of government-appointed political
representatives to meet on a permanent basis to exchange ideas, draft
plans, and help implement and enforce environmental policies and
treaties.
In creating such a political and administrative body, practices of
existing international organizations-whether or not they focus on en-
vironmental affairs-need to be dissected and used as models.
Among the most progressive and successful of the new environmental
organizations is the Global Environment Facility (GEF). Although it
is more cooperative endeavor than pure "international institution," s
the GEF has proven to be both a microcosm of the entire global envi-
ronmental structure and an evolving, ever-improving international en-
vironmental body. Accordingly, the GEF's short history merits study
as a model for the establishment of a new global oversight mechanism.
Practices utilized by other international bodies to ensure compliance
with treaty mandates also deserve attention.
Presenting ideas for new institutional models which mimic the
positive components of existing international bodies and ignore their
6. Abdulbar Al-Gain, Agenda 21: The Challenge of Implementation, in A LAW FOR
Tm ENvnoi Tmn- 21, 29 (Alexandre Kiss & Frangoise Burhenne-Guilmin eds., 1994);
Weiss, supra note 5, at 698-99.
7. See generally Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways To Make International Environmental
Law, 86 AM J. INT'L L. 259 (1980); U.N. Docs. AJCONF.1511PC36, AICONF.151IP0
(1990); DANIEL Es., GREENING THE GAIT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE
(1994); M.F. Strong, Statement to the World Federation of United Nations Associations
(WFUNA) at Halifax (June 5, 1988) cited in Peter H. Sand, Trusts for the Earth: New
Financial Mechanisms for International Environmental Protection, 10th Josephine Onoh
Memorial Lecture (University of Hull, Feb. 21, 1994), at 18; P. Szasz, Restncturing the
International Organizational Framework, ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW: NEW CHALLENGES AND Dn~sm~sioNs 340, 356 (Edith Weiss ed. 1992) cited in
LAKSHMAN GURuswAMY ET AL, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AND WORLD
ORDER 1083 (1994).
8. Cf. The Global Environment Facility, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMEN-T AFFAIRS
137, 140 (1991).
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difficulties is, of course, much easier than garnering support for and
establishing such an institution. Due to domestic and gjlobal political
attitudes with respect to international organizations-with their em-
phases on downsizing and vehement aversion to bureaucracy-formu-
lators of any new mechanisms will have to focus on ways of achieving
goals efficiently without creating more "institutional fatigue."9 Addi-
tional hurdles face a body created to discuss new, and help implement
existing, international environmental agreements. Any new institu-
tion would require a carefully calibrated mandate narrow enough to
ensure efficiency, but sufficiently broad to achieve needed change.
Furthermore, the new institution would need to gain the recognition
and support of existing international environmental institutions to en-
sure its own effectiveness, legitimacy, and power. Finally, and perhaps
most significantly, the institution's source of authority would have to
address the relationship between treaty enforcement and the sover-
eign rights of nations.10
Part II of this note examines the modest institutional structure in
place for the consolidation of environmental principles -and for coordi-
nating the implementation and enforcement of global environmental
agreements. Currently, poorly funded and understaffed treaty secre-
tariats-as well as other international environmental organizations re-
sponsible for carrying out treaties-frequently act in an independent,
disjointed manner, despite the fact that they often share similar goals
and possess similar institutional arrangements."
Part III investigates the on-going evolution of the GEF, its effects
upon the nations and organizations involved in its decision making,
and the countries and communities which have benefited from its
funding. More precisely, this note explores the issues of North-South
equity, NGO participation, funding, incentives, and administrations
9. Mohammed T. EI-Ashry, The Road from Rio: Implications of the UN Conference
on Environment and Development for the World Bank, 1993 THE JOURNAL OF ENVIRON.
MENT AND DEVELOPMENT 67, 77.
10. The nature of international law, which generally prevents a majority of states from
trampling the sovereign rights of any single nation, see, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1,
presents what many commentators call an insurmountable hurdle to full enforcement of
international accords. See, e.g., Phillippe J. Sands, Environment, Community and Interna-
tional Law, 20 HARV. INT'L LJ. 393, 397-98 (1989). It is not the intention of this note to
expound upon the legal limitations of living in a world of independent states. Rather, it
proposes institutional practices which could be adopted for use by existing international
environmental institutions or which, with the passage of time and evolution of interna-
tional law, might signal the birth of a new international environmental oversight
mechanism.
11. Weiss, supra note 5, at 700.
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that have been and continue to be tackled by the GEF. It presents the
GEF as a successful model for the future of international environmen-
tal discussion and for the resolution of global environmental
problems.' Although battles continue to rage as the member states
and NGOs involved with the GEF grapple over power, a balanced
institutional model has begun to emerge that employs progressive
practices to attack global environmental problems.
Part IV looks at how contemporary U.S. domestic politics have
affected the establishment and support of international environmental
institutions. This note concludes that the U.S. position with respect to
such cooperative efforts has remained unenthusiastic due primarily to
domestic political and economic concerns, and to questions about the
efficacy of existing international institutions. Although some of its
criticisms are valid, the United States government should move swiftly
out of its environmental vacillation and take the opportunity to join
this global enterprise. The U.S. could thereby ensure its own positive
role in future global environmental discussion and assure the trans-
parency, accountability, and vitality of any new international environ-
mental institutions.
Part V focuses on the strengths and shortcomings of the United
Nations Environment Program and the Committee on Sustainable
Development in their roles as international environmental oversight
bodies.
Finally, Part VI examines the model for a new environmental
"legislature" proposed by Geoffrey Palmer and suggests how it might
be improved. It focuses on institutional aspects of the GEF, the Or-
ganization of American States, the United Nations Environment and
Development Programs, and UNESCO, which could be incorporated
into a new international environmental institution to aid its effective-
ness and efficiency. Part VI also acknowledges the increasing impor-
tance of international trade agreements and of private sector and
NGO participation in environmental treaty implementation and
enforcement.
I conclude that the time is ripe for systemic overhaul. The solu-
tion to current environmental treaty deficiencies may be to create an
international environmental oversight institution-though "non-insti-
12. This note does not, however, propose to discuss the prudence of keeping the GEF
as the primary funding mechanisms of international treaties. Rather, this note sets out the
GEF as a case study for the establishment of financing mechanisms which provide grants
for independent environmental projects and as a model for the creation of an international
environmental umbrella institution.
1995]
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tution" would probably be a better term. Although its immediate suc-
cess as a treaty implementor is far from assured, permanent focus on
enforcement of environmental treaties is desperately necessary as a
catalyst to ensure the expansion of international environmental ac-
cord and the safeguarding of the Earth's ecological bounty. Even if
world governments are presently unready to establish such an institu-
tion-whether it be by creating an entirely new supragovernmental or
intergovernmental institution or by granting new powers to an existing
body-reviewing and emulating successful negotiation, implementa-
tion, and enforcement practices employed by existing international or-
ganizations could help to improve the current international
environmental legal structure.
H. CURRENT MECHANISMS FOR ENFORCING
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
AGREEMENTS
There is no more difficult problem confronting international or-
ganisations today than that of evolving modes of taking important
decisions which will command general respect and give such deci-
sions the weight necessary to make them effective in practice. The
problem has been a continuing one throughout the history of inter-
national organisations and we are still far from having achieved any
satisfactory solution of it.... The problem now is primarily one of
devising procedures and safeguards to ensure that decisions are
taken with a degree of deliberation and sense of responsibility com-
mensurate with their importance. We appear to be entering upon a
new phase in which the keynote is no longer either unanimity or
majority decision but consensus. The wheel has not come, and will
not come, full circle, but there has been a marked shift of emphasis
from the desire to ensure that decisions are no longer blocked by a
requirement of unanimity or a veto to the desire to ensure that they
reflect a sufficiently wide consensus to make them effective in
practice.' 3
Thirty years after Jenks's essay, the global enviromnental political
structure has begun the process of consensus building. Numerous
treaties and conventions have been signed and consensus has been
reached on many international environmental issues. Still, many of
13. Clarence Wilfred Jenks, Unanimity, the Veto, Weighted Voting, Special and Simple
Majorities and Consensus as Modes of Decision in International Organisations, CAMBRIDO
ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 48 (1965), republished in FREDERIC L. KIRoIS, INTERNA.
TIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING 214-15 (2d ed. 1950).
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the agreements signed in recent years have not been effectively imple-
mented or enforced. This difficulty can be attributed to many factors.
First, individual international agreements must generally proceed
through demanding home-country ratification processes and, since
many are non self-executing, need domestic implementing legislation
before they can be enforced. 4 For example, the United States Consti-
tution provides that the President shall have the power, "by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-
thirds of the Senators present concur."'' Under modern international
law principles, the signature, upon a treaty,16 of state officials with
authority to negotiate on behalf of their countries may be virtually
meaningless. 17 Not only does the signature fail to bind the state, in
most cases it does not even require a signatory state to make a good
faith effort to attempt to institute the home-country ratification pro-
cess or to deposit the ratified treaty with the appropriate body.18 The
United States is not the only country with such a system; in fact, many
14. KIrGIS, supra note 13, at 280. Even treaties that are interpreted to be self-execut-
ing may require tacit Congressional approval in order to obtain funding needed for imple-
mentation. Roger W. Findley, The Incorporation of International Environmental Treaty
Law into National Law in a Federal System: Problems, Obstacles and Solutions, in DROrT
DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT Er D-VELOPPEhiFENT DuRABUE 25, 30-31 (1994).
15. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
16. The terms "convention" and "treaty" are used interchangeably in this Note. More
precisely, "treaty" means an "intergovernmental agreement concluded between States in
written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument
or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation." Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 2. 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, entered into
force Jan. 27, 1980. A "convention" is defined as "[a] pact or agreement between states or
nations in the nature of a treaty, usually applied (a) to agreements or arrangements prelim-
inary to a formal treaty or to serve as its basis, or (b) international agreements for the
regulation of matters of common interest but not coming within the sphere of politics or
commercial intercourse .... " Bt.AcK's LAW DICTIONARY 401 (6th ed. 1990).
17. International agreements have proven particularly difficult to enforce when they
take the form of conventions signed during international law-making conferences.
Conventions are signed at these conferences, and often require ratification before
they become binding. There is normally no obligation on governments participat-
ing in such a conference to submit signed conventions to any domestic approval
or ratification process. (Thus, in the case of the United States, there would nor-
mally be no international obligation to submit such a ... convention to the Senate
for its advice and consent or to Congress for legislative approval.) Moreover,
even if such a convention is approved by the domestic process, the state is not
normally under any international obligation to ratify it. That is, it does not have
to take the final step of signifying to the other signatories or parties its intention
to be bound. If it does not ratify such a convention, it is not bound by it.
KiRGiS, supra note 13, at 280.
18. Id.
19951
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nations quick to negotiate international environmental accords have
been slow to ratify and enforce their commitments. 9
Unfortunately, many states which sign international environmen-
tal accords fail to enact implementing legislation to assure their effec-
tive execution. Those countries which attempt to advance treaties
through national ratification processes often draft ill-conceived and
poorly structured domestic legislation. This system of treaty approval
often fails to give effect to international instruments, leaving them as
virtual "dead letters. 20
Second, positivist notions of international law require that states
be bound only when they have given their express or tacit consent to
be the subject of an international right or obligation.2 1 Thus, under
currently existing international law principles, state sovereignty must
generally prevail over the concerns of the international community.
This is true even if a clear majority of world governments support the
imposition of new rights or obligations at the international level. This
dilemma is particularly evident in the environmental context. Be-
cause individual states owe duties to their own citizens and neighbor-
ing countries, but not to international society as a whole, great doubt
exists about whether nations have the ability to enforce existing or
future rules to protect the environment.'
Some commentators conclude that international environmental
protection is impossible without a wholesale refocus of the basic un-
derpinnings of international law.23 As PhUllipe J. Sands has noted,
"[u]ntil international law moves away from the view that international
society comprises a community of states, and comes to encompass the
persons (both legal and natural) within those states, it will not be able
to provide even the most elementary framework for the protection of
the environment."24 Other observers believe that international law's
transition towards recognizing these new international actors and obli-
gations has already begun with the crumbling of the wall separating
19. Palmer, supra note 7, at 263-64.
20. See Andronico 0. Adede, Lessons from 7venty Years of International Law-mak-
ing in the Field of the Environment 1972-1992 in A LAW FOR THE EwvIRONMENT, supra
note 6, at 11, 16.
21. KiRcGs, supra note 13, at 274.
22. See Sands, supra note 10, at 397-98.
23. Id at 399.
24. Id.
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private international law and its public counterpart, as evidenced by
progress made in the field of human rights.25
Third, international environmental treaties often lack domestic
enforcement mechanisms precisely because environmental agree-
ments are put into effect by secretariats, international organizations,
and other international bodies which lack "international jurisdic-
tion."26 Unlike the U.N. Security Council, which is afforded jurisdic-
tion under the U.N. Charter to confront threats to international peace
and security, enforcers of environmental accords must frequently
complete their tasks without power to penalize signatory nations
which ignore their promises.27
Assuming that ratifying states follow the doctrine of pacta sunt
servanda by performing their treaty obligations in good faith S struc-
tural problems may still hamper the effective implementation of trea-
ties. Treaty instruments usually delegate enforcement powers to
implementing organs. Many establish an organizational structure
comprised of a plenary body of government representatives from each
of the treaty's signatory countries, a smaller body which meets more
frequently-normally called a permanent council-and a secretariat2 9
The largest body generally makes most overarching decisions while
the mid-size body handles interim, usually less controversial decision-
making3 0 Treaty secretariats are usually placed in charge of imple-
menting individual international agreements on a day-to-day basis,
thus placing the bulk of the monitoring and implementation work, as
well as attempts at enforcement, on their shoulders.3 1
Frequently, it is not only the broad treaty frameworks which re-
quire consensus, but also the rule-making and specific agreements
which follow conventions. 2 States may willfully relinquish portions of
their sovereignty when they sign and ratify treaties, but they are less
25. See, eg., John E. Barton & Barry E. Carter, International Law and Institutions for
a New Age, 81 GEo. L.J. 535, 538-39 (1993).
26. Cf. Anthony Clark Arend, The United Nations and the New World Order, 81 GEO.
LJ. 496, 500 (1993). See also Fmdley, supra note 14, at 25.
27. Arend, supra note 26, at 503.
28. According to Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: "Every
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good
faith." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 16, art. 26. Moreover, sub-
ject to Article 46, a party to a treaty may not "invoke the provisions of its internal law as
justification for its failure to perform a treaty." Id. art. 27.
29. KiRGis, supra note 13, at 274-75.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 274-81.
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willing to concede their sovereign rights (viz., to control their own
resources and not to be the subjects of majoritarian decision-making
on the international plane) when rules are made by governing and
administrative bodies granted powers under treaties.
33
Historical arguments in which the "North blames the South34 for
the worst environmental abuses and mismanagement, while the South
demands that international equity issues be addressed as a precondi-
tion for environmental policy improvement," 35 are played out again
and again within the plenary bodies and committees of individual
treaty institutions. Some commentators conclude that treaty signato-
ries engage in similar, contentious debates with the negotiation, for-
mation, and adoption of each new treaty.3 6 LDCs and industrialized
nations struggle with issues such as qualifications for membership,
voting rights, the make-up of the plenary body, funding, monitoring,
and enforcement. The wheel of institutional structure must conse-
quently be reinvented with each new international environmental
"agreement. ' 37
Implementing and enforcing international environmental treaties
is especially burdensome for secretariats because their duties are not
always precisely defined, budgets are limited, and many treaties are
not self-executing. In some cases, agreements are made which lack
specific enforcement organs altogether.38 Under these circumstances,
little hope exists that a treaty will be implemented, particularly if it is
controversial in nature.
Many secretariats cannot effectively implement their own treaties
without substantial aid from other international organizations. 39 Due
to limited budgets and to the fact that the effective implementation of
treaty mandates requires expertise in a wide variety of areas, secretar-
33. Id. at 281 (citing Art. 38(1) Statute of the International Court of Justice), See also
U.N. CHARTER art. 93.
34. "North" refers to industrialized countries, while "South" refeis to LDCs.
35. Steven E. Sanderson, Environmental Politics in Latin America, in ENVIRONMEN.
TAL POLITICS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA 223, 232 (Sheldon Kamieniecki ed., 1993).
36. See Weiss, supra note 5, at 700; See generally, Samaan, supra note 4.
37. Palmer, supra note 7, at 263.
38. For example, after an agreement was reached at the Ministerial Conference on
Drinking Water and Environmental Sanitation in the Netherlands, a Dutch Environment
Minister rationalized that the Committee for Sustainable Development (CSD) had the re-
sponsibility to implement the action program because no other global organization was
specifically charged with water issues. Water Resources, Governments Should Outline
Measures on Water Services by 1997, Conference Says, BNA IN-'L ENV'T DAILY, Apr. 13,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, BNAIED File.
39. Samaan, supra note 4, at 261-70.
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iats must look outside their own institutional frameworks for technical
and other assistance.4 ° Since different organizations have different
specialties, sharing information is essential if secretariats are to ade-
quately fulfill their mandates. Secretariats, for example, regularly in-
teract with related United Nations arms, such as the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) and the United Nations Environment
Program (UNEP)-both of which are ostensibly coordinated under
the U.N. Economic and Social Council.4 1 This system often slows im-
plementation and enforcement and creates large-scale bureaucracy.
Secretariats, like individual departments of national governments,
sometimes compete rather than cooperate because each is jockeying
for scarce funding, legitimacy, and power. 42 Administrators who
should facilitate environmental improvement often spend considera-
ble effort blocking ideas.43 In practice this understaffed, under-suc-
cessful, and still over-bureaucratized system hampers the effective
implementation and dispersal of funds for international environmen-
tal projects. 44
Under the disjointed legal mechanisms currently in place, treaty
secretariats act independently despite the fact that they often share
similar mandates, perform similar functions, and require similar insti-
tutional arrangements. 45 This system, which presupposes that sepa-
rate structures can best implement individual treaties, has left the
coordination of international environmental agreements to a pluralist
group which, though it frequently interacts, lacks a coordinated, unify-
ing institutional arrangement to act as an oversight mechanism. In the
field of environmental law, Sir Geoffrey Palmer has referred to this
predicament as the "Institutional Gap."46
While the importance of encouraging global cooperation for the
creation and implementation of environmental accords has not gone
unnoticed by treaty drafters and signatories,47 the current system of
40. For example, the Organization of American States (OAS) and United Nations re-
cently signed a new mutual assistance agreement. Inspector General Guillermo Belt of the
OAS, Address to OAS interns at Washington, DC (June 22, 1995).
41. Palmer, supra note 7, at 259-61.
42. See Al-Gain, supra note 6, at 30.
43. Id.
44. lId
45. See Samaan, supra note 4, at 271-72.
46. Palmer, supra note 7, at 260.
47. See, e.g., Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 7, stating
that: "States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and re-
store the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem.... ." See also the European Com-
munity's 5th Environmental Action Programme, which echoes the sentiments of Principle
1995]
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establishing separate secretariats to enforce each new treaty fails to
sufficiently recognize the inherently overlapping nature of the world's
environmental problems. The Earth's natural resources, including
water and plant life, function together; the destruction of one gener-
ally has adverse consequences on the others. Similarly, treaties writ-
ten to protect one natural resource will necessarily impact other
natural resources and hence other environmental trealies. For exam-
ple, a project to protect a coastline might involve not only conserva-
tion of water quantity and quality, but also the protection of aquatic
animal and plant life, coral reefs, and other aspects of the region's
biodiversity. Thus, when implementing projects focusing on one area
of international agreement, other areas and treaties must also be
considered.
The fact that many nations have not accepted the validity of some
of the most basic tenets of environmental protection also hampers the
effective implementation and enforcement of environmental accords.
In addition, some states feel they can placate citizens, NGOs, and
other governments by signing treaties they have no intention of carry-
ing out.
The establishment of a new international environmental over-
sight body could catalyze the consolidation of basic environmental
principles and the resolution of the difficulties currently plaguing the
international environmental legal structure. Organizing a permanent,
environmental oversight organ charged with coordinating, implement-
ing, and enforcing environmental accords, which might also draft reg-
ulations and act as a forum for the negotiation of new environmental
agreements, could lead to a more rapid and successful global meeting
of the minds. Should the creation of an entirely new institution be
premature, as many argue it is,4 8 great benefits may still be realized by
engrafting successful systemic practices upon existing global environ-
mental bodies and international institutions.
III. THE FORMATION AND CURRENT
ROLE OF THE GEF
Environmental treaty implementation has proven contentious,
yet more efficient, in situations where signatory nations are not held
7 with a bit more lucidity. Both are cited in Margaret Brusacso-Mackenzie, The Role of the
European Communities, in Tim ENvmocmNT AFrER Rio 23,24 (Luigi Campiglio et al.
eds., 1994); Weiss, supra note 5, at 699; Barton & Carter, supra note 25, at 553-54. See also
U.N. CHARTER, art. 58.
48. See Sand, supra note 7, at 19; Weiss, supra note 5, at 699.
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to comply with particular environmental standards (e.g., emission lim-
its), but where the treaty instead calls for funding to be funneled from
developed countries to LDCs in order to safeguard existing natural
resources. In the latter circumstances, developed countries are not
asked to restructure their own practices; rather, they forfeit funds and
forego self-purging.4 9 Developing countries become the host to envi-
ronmental projects implemented under this method. The GEF is one
institutional example of this type of arrangement.
The GEF was established in 1990 as an international mechanism
through which vital funds and technology could be directed from
richer nations towards developing countries to help address global en-
vironmental problems.50 The original eighteen developed countries
involved with the foundation of the project51 agreed that:
The GEF should support programs and activities for which benefits
would accrue to the world at large while the country undertaking
the measures would bear the cost, and which would not otherwise
be supported by existing development assistance or environment
programs .... [Fjunding for the GEF should to the greatest possi-
ble extent be additional to existing aid flows....
The participants further agreed that substantial developing coun-
try representation in all facets of the organization was essential.5 3 The
general agreement regarding the specific responsibilities and organiza-
tional structure of the GEF, the Enabling Memorandum, was ap-
proved on March 14, 1991.54
The GEF's framers designed the institution to assist developing
countries to attack four central global environmental problems: (1)
chlorofluorocarbon (CF) and halon emissions and the subsequent
depletion of the ozone layer;5 5 (2) the protection of oceans and inter-
49. Examples of such mechanisms are joint implementation and debt-for-nature
swaps.
50. The GEF was first proposed by Germany and France in September 1989. Cins-
TOPHER D. STONE, THE GNAT Is OLDER THAN MAN 226 (1993).
51. Those nations were Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Sitzerland, the
United Kingdom, the United States, and, shortly thereafter, New Zealand.
52. World Bank- Documents Concerning the Establishment of the Global Environment
Facility, 30 bIrr'L LEGAL MATERmALs 1735, 1740 (Am. Soc. Of Int'l L. Nov. 1991).
53. Id at 1745.
54. I1d at 1758.
55. Specifically, developing countries are supplied with assistance to help them make
the transition from CFC use to available alternatives. The GEF supplements and acts as
the funding mechanism for the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer
(1985), and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987).
1995]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
national river systems;56 (3) the elimination of greenhouse gas emis-
sions and global warming; 57 and (4) the prevention of devastation of
biological diversity due to depletion of natural resources and natural
habitat degradation. 8 These four areas were chosen because of their
global nature and because they "remained outside the purview of ex-
isting institutions."5 9 In coming years, this mandate will likely expand
to cover the prevention of land degradation as it relates to deforesta-
tion and desertification.
60
To achieve these goals the framers established a tripartite sys-
tem61 under which UNEP, UNDP, and the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development ("World Bank") shared responsibility
for implementing the GEF agreement.6 The three-part structure was
created because "no single international agency command[ed] all the
skills and experience needed to carry out [all GEF] functions." 63 Con-
siderable and consistent inter-agency collaboration was set forth as a
way to ensure that all aspects of project proposals and implementation
would be thoroughly discussed prior to and during a project's founda-
tion and operation."
Charles E. DiLeva, The World Bank and Environmental Law: A Pos-t-Rio Summary of
Activities, C883 ALI-ABA 525, 526-28 (Feb. 17, 1994). World Bank: Documents Concern-
ing the Establishment of the Global Environment Facility, supra note 52, at 1739.
56. The funding is designed to establish programs to protect both marine and fresh-
water environments, study and improve deballasting techniques, clean up toxic waste pol-
lution and upgrade contingency planning for oil spills. This effort continued the efforts of
the signatories to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
1973/1978 (MARPOL). DiLeva, supra note 55, at 527-28.
57. GEF funding is directed toward the adoption of cleaner burning fuels, energy effi-
ciency, and improved technologies. This financing supplements the plans outlined and
funding allotted in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change signed
in Rio de Janeiro during the Earth Summit in 1992. That convention identifies the GEF as
the funding mechanism for implementation of the treaty. World Bank: Documents Con.
cerning the Establishment of the Global Environment Facility, supra note 52, at 1739.
58. This goal parallels the Convention on Biological Diversity ("Bodliversity featy")
also signed at Rio which, like the Climate Change Convention, named the GEF as the
interim financial funding mechanism.
59. WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILrrY: INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF
TmE PILOT PHASE xii (1994).
60. DiLeva, supra note 55, at 528.
61. WORLD BANK, OPERATIONAL COOPERATION UNDER THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
FAcILITY (Oct. 1991).
62. The three implementing agencies signed the tripartite "Operational Cooperation
under the Global Environment Facility" agreement in October 1991. This marked the
commencement of the GEF pilot phase. WORLD BANK, supra note 59, at xii.
63. World Bank. Documents Concerning the Establishment of the Global Environment
Facility, supra note 52, at 1741.
64. Id at 1746.
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The framers envisioned that UNDP would use its worldwide net-
work of offices to help identify projects, provide technical assistance
to those hoping to establish a funded project, and manage the NGO
arm of the small grants program.65 The Enabling Memorandum
charges UNEP with ensuring that GEF decision-making and funding
are consistent with the Facility's Articles of Agreement and with inter-
national conventions naming the GEF as its financial mechanism.66 In
addition, the UNEP secretariat established a Scientific and Technical
Advisory Panel (STAP), comprised of sixteen scientists, to review the
innovation, expected effectiveness, and overall structure of project
proposals.67 The World Bank took on trustee and administrative re-
sponsibilities, acting as a repository for the Global Environment Trust
Fund,' and as the primary implementor of investment projects. 69 The
Bank was to use much of its pre-existing financial and legal frame-
work to administer the GEF,70 and to a considerable degree, to incor-
porate its well established "project cycle" approach to monitor the
development and completion of individual projects71 Each member
introduced its own monitoring, implementation, and evaluation pro-
grams to the GEF
The GEF Secretariat, located in the World Bank's Washington,
DC headquarters, was charged with administering the facility's day-to-
day operations. The participating countries, which sent delegates to
both the plenary and mid-level bodies, agreed to meet semiannually to
review the application of the terms and conditions of the articles of
agreement, discuss the GEF's overall policy framework, consider pro-
65. The participants envisioned that local NGOs in lesser developed countries would
help to give advice on the implementation and design of local biodiversity projects. Id. at
1747.
66. Id at 1747.48.
67. Id at 1747.
68. GET is comprised of grant money with no strings attached given directly to the
GEF for use in any GEF approved project and co-financing arrangements. WoRWD BANw,
supra note 59, at 20.
69. Id The UNDP, UNEP, and World Bank are also collaborators on the Environ-
mental Program for the Mediterranean. World Bank- Documents Concerning the Estab-
lishment of the Global Environment Facility, supra note 52, at 1746.
70. World Bank, Resolution 91-5, 11, 30 LL.M. 1761. See also International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development Articles of Agreement, July, 1944, T.I.A.S. 1502,
U.N.T.S. 134 (entered into force Dec. 27, 1945).
71. World Bank: Documents Concerning the Establislunent of the Global Environment
Facility, supra note 52, at 1743.
72. The Global Environment Facility, supra note 8, at 14041.
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posed programs and projects, and review project progress.73 Special
consideration was to be given to projects slated to receive more than
US$5 million in funding.74
A. GEF Funding
The GEF receives funding from its member states in the form of
grants and cofinancing arrangements. 75 Outright grants from individ-
ual member-nations, which represent the great majority of GEF fund-
ing, are funneled into the recently renamed Global Environment Trust
Fund which was formerly called the GET or "Core Fund. 76 The
Trust Fund is directly administered by GEF representatives and offi-
cials, comprised of the Enabling Memorandum tripartite system dur-
ing the pilot phase, and since July 1994, by the GEF governing council.
Funds are allocated based on the criteria set forth in the GEF general
agreement.77 Member states, by consensus, directly select the major-
ity of specific projects to be funded by the GEF after a comprehensive
proposal process.78
Co-financing is a separate arrangement by which donor nations
commit to funding projects through their own institutional mecha-
nisms rather than through the GET Fund. GEF co-financiers agreed
that their contributions would be available under the same guidelines
73. World Bank. Documents Concerning the Establishment of the Global Environment
Facility, supra note 52, at 1743.
74. Id. at 1744.
75. The Articles of Agreement specified that the GEF preferred to receive grant fund-
ing. Id. at 1750-52.
76. GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY, THE RESTRUCTURED GEF: QuEsnONS AND
ANswERs 1 (1995).
77. World Bank: Documents Concerning the Establishment of the Global Environment
Facility, supra note 52, at 1750.
78. The GEF originally required members to pay an initiation fee. For the three-year
pilot phase, new members were initially obliged to pay Special Drawing Rights (SDR) 4
million (about US$5.7 million in convertible currency), but this requirement was dropped
in the spring of 1992. Id. at 1749-50; David Eugene Bell, The 1992 Convention on Biologi-
cal Diversity: The Continuing Significance of U.S. Objections at the Ear/h Summit, 26 Ggo.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 479, 506 n. 175 (1993) (citing Report of the Intergovernmental
Negotiating Committee for a Convention on Biological Diversity on the Work of its Seventh
Negotiating Session/Fifth Session ofINC, U.N. Environment Program, 7th Sess., at 20, U.N.
Doc. UNEP/Bio.Div/N7-INC.5/4 (1992)). An SDR is an artificial currency based on the
average worth of the U.S. Dollar, French Franc, Pound Sterling, .apanese Yen, and
Deutsche-Mark, and has been recently valued at approximately 1.2 dollars each. DAVID
DRISCoLL, WHAT is THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FuND 18-19 (IMF revised ed., Jan.
1991).
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as grants or on a highly concessional basis comparable to that em-
ployed for Core Fund allocationsl 9
Developed countries with UNDP programs and a Gross National
Product below US$4,000 in 1989 qualified to receive partial allotments
of the more than US$1.2 billion in funding made available by donor
nations during the three-year pilot phase from July 1991 to July
1994.80
GEF funds are primarily directed toward "incremental co sts. 's1
These costs have been defined as "the difference between the 'domes-
tic costs' a country would have to pay to achieve a global environmen-
tal benefit and the 'domestic benefit' it would receive as a result of the
action." 82 Despite the official definition, this term has proven ambigu-
ous in implementation; World Bank and GEF officials themselves
have had a difficult time defining and applying it to given situations.
The GEF thus does not normally fund projects which host nations
could afford to fund themselves unless compelling reasons can be
given which show: 1) that the operation in question would not pro-
ceed without GEF involvement;84 2) that regular development aid fi-
nancing mechanisms were unavailable; or 3) that GEF financing
arrangements could provide for additional global environmental bene-
fits that could not be achieved with existing national funding.8 Be-
cause the cost of funding projects, even on an incremental cost basis,
79. World Bank: Documents Concerning the Establishment of the Global Environment
Facility, supra note 52, at 1750.
80. Id. at 1749. See also WORLD BAN., supra note 59, at xi. In fact, the GEF granted
US$730 million to fund 115 projects during the pilot phase. GLOBAL EsvmoN tN-r FA.
cu-rrY, supra note 76, at 4.
81. WoRL BANK, TnE GLOBAL ENVIRONmENr FACLurr. Brzvoxi Tm Pumor
PHASn 52-53 (1992).
82. Difficulty in determining the exact amount of incremental costs in a given project
prompted the GEF to fund a US$2.6 million program, the Program for Measuring Incre-
mental Costs for the Environment (PRINCE), to set usable guidelines for tallying figures.
David Fairman, Report of the Independent Evaluation of the Global Environment Facility
Pilot Phase, ENvmoN MNr, July 1994, at 25; GLOBAL ENvmoNom" FACIrrT, supra note
76, at 4.
83. DiLeva, supra note 55, at 527-28.
84. The incremental cost method of funding has been criticized by both developed and
developing countries as it is impossible to replace the political process of choosing projects
to be funded with a mechanistic formula. Womm BANK, supra note 81, at 52-53 (citing the
Stockholm workshop on Incremental Costs and Biodiversity Conservation report to the
Executive Director of UNEP, Oct. 26, 1993).
85. World Bank: Documents Concerning the Establishment of the Global Environment
Facility, supra note 52, at 1742-43.
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is often extremely high, 6 project proposals also require a rationale for
GEF involvement explaining how additional funding would relate to
one of the GEF's four focal areas.87
During the pilot phase, proposals could be generated by local or
national government entities, the UNDP, the World Bank, the UNEP,
private sector facilities, international organizations, or NGOs.
8 8
While specific recipients of GEF funding, whether they were local
communities, NGOs working on behalf of regions or nations, or na-
tional financing and environmental agencies, had primalry responsibil-
ity for the implementation of the individual projects, national
governments also had to approve the projects before funding would
be allocated.8 9 The criteria for project selection required proposed
undertakings to follow global environmental conventions, maintain
consistency with country-specific environmental strategies, utilize ap-
propriate technology, and be cost-effective and of high priority from a
global point of view.9"
B. Positive Aspects of the GEF Pilot Phase
Despite these rigid procedures, the GEF has managed to meet its
mandate and fund numerous environmental projects throughout the
world.91 During the pilot phase, which ended in July 1994 but whose
completed funding will not be fully met until 1998, 92 the GEF began
funding projects totalling over US$300 million for biodiversity, over
US$281 million towards global warming, nearly US$100 million for
86. For example, the GEF spent approximately US$35,000 per square kilometer on its
biodiversity convention projects. Paul Roberts, Note, International Funding for the Con-
servation of Biological Diversity: Convention on Biological Diversity, 10 B.U. INT'L L.J.
303, 317 n.80 (1992).
87. See DiLeva, supra note 55, at 527-28.
88. In fact, NGOs heavily participated at the proposal and implementation stages of
many GEF projects. WORLD BANK, supra note 59, at 21. Under the GEF Council admin-
istration instated in 1994, the United Nations organizations' and World Bank's role in gen-
erating proposals has been limited. Other international organizations and bodies are,
however, still heavily involved in aiding GEF eligible communities to create, propose, and
implement projects. See generally GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY, QUARTERLY OPERA-
TIONAL REPORT. APRIL 1995 (1995).
89. WORLD BANK, supra note 59, at 21; World Bank- Documents Concerning the Es-
tablishment of the Global Environment Facility, supra note 52, at 1745.
90. World Bank Documents Concerning the Establishment of the Global Environment
Facility, supra note 52, at 1743-44.
91. See generally WORLD BANK, supra note 59, at xvi-xvii.
92. See David Reed, The Global Environment Facility and Non-Governmental Organi-
zations, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 191, 195 (1993).
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international waters, and US$5.7 million to prevent ozone depletion.93
In total, GEF participants endorsed 115 projects valued at more than
US$736 million.94 Since early 1994, new projects have been approved
for a variety of programs including the protection of biodiversity in
Central America,95 the protection of Sumatran rhinos in Indonesia,
96
and funding for an energy project in South Africa.
97
The GEF has also had some success with its small grants projects.
Through the end of 1993, these grants had provided monies to com-
munity-based projects in over twenty countries, and were operational
in more than thirty-three countries in 1995.98 This program attempts
to "test small-scale activities and approaches that could help alleviate
global level environmental concerns if replicated successfully on a
larger scale over time."'  Grants of up to US$50,000 for national
projects or US$250,000 for regional projects are delivered by the
UNDP arm of the GEF to programs focusing on reducing greenhouse
gas emission, reducing water pollution, and protecting biodiversity.1c
UNDP involvement allows for more direct interaction with local com-
munities and NGOs than could be achieved in a larger scale project.101
During the pilot phase, the program committed US$5.7 million of its
US$10 million budget to projects in twenty-four countries.102 Projects
funded included: 1) US$50,000 to a Jordanian group monitoring air
pollution; 2) US$9,000 to a refrigerator manufacturer's group in
Ghana to give lectures on ozone depletion to factory workers; and 3)
US$16,000 to a Filipino organization for the establishment of a gene
bank for environmental education and for conserving indigenous me-
93. WORLD BANK, supra note 59, at xvi-xvii. The ozone funding provided by the GEF
was in addition to funding provided through the Montreal Protocol.
94. WORLD BANK, THm WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT 199447 (1994); GLOBAL EN-
vrmoimr FAcnTY, 14 BuLLEnm & QuA'ERL.x OPERAMTONAL SuWMARY 2 (Apr.
1995).
95. Felipe Jaime, Central America-Environmen" Region to Receive $640 Million in
Aid, Inter Press Service, Oct. 13, 1994, available in LEXIS, New Library, INPRES File.
96. Gwen Benjamin, Breeding Plan Last Hope to Save Rare Sumatran Rhinos, Japan
Economic Newswire, Jan. 3, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, JEN File.
97. South Africa Restructures, ENERGY ECONO.IsT (Energy Section), Nov. 1994,
available in LEXIS, PATENT Library, ENRECO File.
98. WORLD BANK, supra note 59, at Annex 6. GLOBAL ENviRONIME r FAcILIT,
supra note 76, at 6.
99. WORLD BANK, supra note 59, at 80.
100. ld; GLOBAL E, movmrir FACILrY, supra note 76, at 6.
101. WoRL BANK, supra note 59, at 80.
102. Id. at 81.
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dicinal plants.1"3 In addition, GEF's use of local endowment funds
and foundations in LDCs has also been successful.
1°4
The GEF has also incorporated mechanisms through which local
communities, non-governmental organizations, and member states
can have greater input into project decision-making. These efforts al-
low NGOs, government agencies, academics, and community leaders
to work together to use the funding to solve local environmental
problems which have global effects.10 5 In some cases, international
NGOs such as the World Wildlife Fund have drawn up complete pro-
ject proposals that have been adopted and submitted by developing
countries' governments to the GEF. 0 6 This program achieves the ad-
ditional benefit of ensuring a broad spectrum of players Rn global envi-
ronmental policy making.' 7
C. Evolution of the GEF
The responsibilities of the GEF broadened during its pilot phase.
First, the GEF became the repository for Montreal Protocol funds and
created its own funding mechanism to complement the Montreal Pro-
tocol.'0 8 Funds amounting to nearly US$160 million' 9 from the origi-
nal Montreal Protocol funding mechanism, the Multilateral Fund,
which became permanent in 1993, were placed in their own special
subdivision of the GEF umbrella called the Ozone Projects Trust
Fund."0 Those funds, though administered by the GEF, are kept sep-
arate from GEF funds held in the GET and are only available for use
by signatories of the Protocol."' In addition, numerous GEF-eligible
countries who are parties to the Montreal Protocol, but are neverthe-
103. Id.
104. Sand, supra note 7, at 23.
105. See, e.g., Gustavo Gonzalez, Chile: Indigenous People Get Help to Save Eco-Sys-
tern, Inter Press Service, July 29, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, INPRES File;
Egypt, GEF Small Grants Program to Fund Eight Groups' Environmental Programs, BNA
INT'L ENV'T DAILY, Jan. 25, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, BNAIED File.
106. Reed, supra note 92, at 209. See also 1 DAVID REED, THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
FACILITY: SHARING RESPONSIBILITY FOR TIm BiosPHEREn 5 (1992).
107. See generally Hahn and Richards, supra note 5.
108. WORLD BANK, supra note 59, at 2; Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete
The Ozone Layer, 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987), 1991 amendments appear at 10 I.L.M. 537.
109. 1 Reed, supra note 106, at 5.
110. World Bank." Documents Concerning the Establishment of the Global Environment
Facility, supra note 52, at 1746-47; Reed, supra note 92, at 196-97. Proposals to merge the
Multilateral Fund with the GEF were unsuccessful. Sand, supra note 7.
111. World Bank. Documents Concerning the Establishment of the Global Environment
Facility, supra note 52, at 1747.
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less unable to secure financial support from the Multilateral Fund,
may qualify for GEF aid."
Because many of the participants in the GEF, particularly those
from developed countries, viewed the facility as complimentary to the
process of establishing framework conventions and accords such as
the Montreal Protocol,"13 it came as no surprise that the Rio EARTH
Summit participants selected the GEF as the interim financing mecha-
nism for the two major agreements signed at the summit. It has been
acknowledged, however, that the relationship between these interna-
tional treaties and the GEF, though explained through treaty lan-
guage and secretariat pronouncements, has been somewhat confused
in practice."
4
D. The Biological Diversity & Climate Change Conventions
More than 150 countries at the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED) signed the United Nations
Environment Programme Convention of Biological Diversity on June
5, 1992.11 Article 39 of the Biological Diversity Convention specifies
that the GEF, UNDP, UNEP, and the World Bank are to provide
interim financial arrangements and serve as the institutional structure
for the convention."16 The parties to the Framework Convention on
Climate Change also named the GEF as the treaty's interim financial
mechanism, 1 7 and the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee ex-
tended that status until 1999.118
112. GLOBAL ENVIRONtmNT FACU.rrY, supra note 76, at 5.
113. World Bank: Documents Concerning the Establishment of the Global Environment
Facility, supra note 52, at 1742.
114. UNEP Head Calls Meeting Successfu4 Cites Significant Progress on Many Issues,
BNA INT'L ENV'T DALY, Dec. 12,1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, BNAIED File.
115. The United States, however, did not sign the treaty during the summit. STANLEY
JOHNSON, THE EARTH SuNm:r. THE UNrrED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENoRONmENT
AND DEVELOP ENT (UNCED) 102 (Graham & Troutman Int'l and Envtl. Law and Pol'y
Series) (1993) (citing United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Con-
vention on Biological Diversity, U.N. Doc. UNEPJBio.DivJConfJL.2 (1992), done June 5,
1992, 31 LL.M. 818 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993)) [hereinafter Biodiversity Conven-
tion]. For an in-depth review on the Biodiversity Convention see Bell, supra note 78.
116. Id: Biodiversity Convention, supra note 115, art. 39.
117. Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 21,31 LLM. at 870. For a discus-
sion of the relationship between the GEF and the Climate Change Convention see Iiuro
Mncrz=R, eIPLE~mNTiNG THE FkAmEwonsi CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANoE: INCRE.
mENTAL CosTs AND THE ROLE OF THE GEF, (Global Environment Facility Working Paper
no. 4, 1993).
118. Climate Change Negotiating Committee Passes Budget Plans for Berlin Afeeting,
BNA INT'L ENV'T DAiLY, Feb. 17,1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, BNAIED File.
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The developed nations succeeded in their wish to have the GEF
act as the funding mechanism for the treaty despite strong objections
by the developing nations, most of which would have preferred the
establishment of a Biological Diversity Fund.119 To address the con-
cerns of the Group of 77,120 which feared that the role of the GEF in
implementation of the conventions would be dominated by the facil-
ity's heavy-contributing developed country members,1 2 1 Agenda 21
included language calling for a significant restructuring of the GEF's
convention-related activities."2 Many LDCs nonetheless expressed
concerns about the interim nature of the GEF role, believing that the
GEF might become the permanent funding mechanism despite Con-
vention language to the contrary.' 23 The Malaysian government dele-
gation expressed its reservations "in the strongest terms that the GEF
has been accepted into the draft Convention, even on an interim basis.
As we all know, in spite of our best efforts and intenlions, these in-
terim measures have the habit of becoming permanent features."
12 4
As of December 1994, the GEF continued to be the "interim" treaty
financing mechanism despite the developing couniries' contrary
pleas."2 Fortunately, the justified fears of the LDCs led to further
negotiations pertaining to the facility's power structure and, ulti-
mately, to greater developed country recognition of LDC concerns.
Due to the on-going compromise, the GEF retained the opportunity
to serve as the "institutional home"-with respect to convention fi-
nance activities-of the two UNCED conventions and gained valua-
ble experience functioning as an oversight mechanism for
environmental trust fund administration. 26
The institutional arrangements formed and struggled with during
and in the wake of the pilot phase mark the true importance of the
119. Bell, supra note 78, at 514.
120. The Group of 77 is comprised of more than 120 African, Asian and Latin Ameri-
can nations and functions "as a kind of caucus for its participants with respect to their
common economic and political concerns.... The Group's impact has been particularly
pronounced in the proceedings of UNClAD." Louis HENKIN ET Ai., INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1395 (3d ed. 1993).
121. See JOHNSON, supra note 115, at 449.
122. Biodiversity Convention, supra note 115, Ch. 33, 1 16 (a)(iii). See also Biodiversity
Convention, Article 39; Sand, supra note 7, at 19-20.
123. Roberts, supra note 86, at 322.
124. 1d.
125. Global Environment Facility to Continue as "Interim" Fin2nclng Source for
Projects, BNA INT'L ENV'T DAILY, Dec. 9, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
BNAIED File.
126. 1 Reed, supra note 106, at 5.
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GEF as a model for the formation of an international environmental
oversight mechanism. The cooperation between multilateral banks,
U.N. development and environmental agencies, and developing coun-
try governments in establishing the GEF was unprecedented.12 7 Non-
governmental organizations, normally weary of such institutions, en-
dorsed the objectives and opportunities of the GEF.12 However,
although the framers sought a relatively equal division of power
within the tripartite, some commentators suggested that the World
Bank effectively ran the GEF as one its own instruments during the
pilot phase.129 This finding led some member states to sound an ur-
gent call for the restructuring of the facility, which was formally
agreed to during UNCED. 13 °
E. The Restructured GEF
Agenda 21 called for a post pilot-phase restructuring of the GEF
prior to continuing its relationship with the two treaties.13 1 GEF re-
structuring, which began in April 1992,132 is still underway. -3 Con-
127. Id. at 4.
128. Id at 1.
129. Id. at 5.
130. GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FAciLrrY, supra note 76, at 2; WoRLD BANH, FACING THE
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT CHALLENGE A PROGRESS REPORT ON WVoRLm BANK GLOBAL
EqRo NmENr OPERATIONS MARCH - MAY 1995 2 (1995). See World Bank Resolution
No. 94-2, May 24, 1992, cited in GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACITrrY, INSTRuMtENTr fOR THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RESTRucrURED GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FAcu.rrv 1 (1994).
131. Biodiversity Convention, supra note 115, art. 21, 1 3. See generally Agenda 21,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/26 (1992), Ch. 33.
132. See Peter I-L Sand, UNCED and the Development of International Environmental
Law, C795 A.LI.-A.B.A. 747,749 (Feb. 11, 1993).
133. Agenda 21 Paragraph 33.16(a)(iii) provides that:
The Global Environment Facility, managed by the World Bank, UNDP and UNEP,
whose additional grant and concessional funding is designed to achieve global environmen-
tal benefits should cover the agreed incremental costs of relevant activities under Agenda
21, in particular for developing countries. Therefore, it should be restructured so as to,
inter alia:
Encourage universal participation.
Have sufficient flexibility to expand its scope and coverage to relevant pro-
gramme areas of Agenda 21, with global environmental benefits, as agreed;
Ensure a governance that is transparent and democratic in nature, including
in terms of decision-making and operations, by guaranteeing a balanced and equi-
table representation of the interests of developing countries, as well as giving due
weight to the funding efforts of donor countries;
Ensure new and additional financial resources on grant and concessional
terms, in particular to developing countries;
Ensure predictability in the flow of funds by contributions from developed
countries, taking into account the importance of equitable burden sharing;,
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tentious meetings concerning GEF restructuring generally pit LDCs
against developed donor countries and NGOs against the entire GEF
structure. Industrialized nations, wishing to retain effective control
over funding decisions, initially blocked LDC attempts to achieve
greater North-South institutional equity. Some significant issues went
unresolved during the first GEF meetings,134 but strides in the areas of
funding and membership have since been achieved. 35
Evaluation of the GEF pilot phase began prior to its termination.
In order to aid in the restructuring process, the GEF commissioned an
independent evaluation of the pilot phase with special focus on the
GEF's mandate and structure, 36 which received generally positive
marks from NGOs and member states alike. 137 The evaluation team
suggested substantial and material changes after assessing issues in-
cluding voting procedure, configuration and size of the Participants'
Assembly, the lack of parity in administrative contexts, and
funding.
138
To its credit, the GEF labeled itself a progressive institution when
it began implementing many of the changes recommended in the re-
port. 39 However, the GEF participants reiterated their commitment
to create no new international environmental bureaucracy. 140
One of the most significant alterations has been the elimination
of much of the World Bank's role in GEF administration. This change
was made after allegations arose that the World Bank's primary role
as a lender for large-scale development projects was incompatible
with its function as the central player in GEF project selection and
administration. 14 ' NGOs lodged complaints that the Bank's disclo-
Ensure access to and disbursement of the funds under mutually agreed crite-
ria without introducing new forms of conditionality ....
Agenda 21, supra note 131, 1 33.16(a)(iii) republished in JoHNsoN, supra note 115, at
452-53.
134. Major Issues Unresolved as PREPCOM Meeting Draws to a Close, BNA INT'L
ENV'T DAILY, Apr. 7, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, BNAIED File.
135. New GEF to Have Universal Membership, Weighted Voting, World Bank An-
nounces, BNA INT'L ENV'T DAILY, May 5, 1992, available in LEX[S, News Library,
BNAIED File.
136. WORLD BANK, supra note 59.
137. See Fairman, supra note 82, at 25; Global Environment Facility Needs Fundamental
Changes, Study Group Says, BNA INT'L ENV'T DAILY, Nov. 30, 1993, available in LEXIS,
News Library, BNAIED File.
138. Reed, supra note 92, at 211.
139. WORLD BANK, supra note 59; GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FAcILrn, supra note 76, at
2.
140. GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FAcILrry, supra note 76, at 2.
141. See generally WORLD BANK, supra note 59, at 133-40.
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sure practices were insufficient. 42 The GEF Council agreed to make
the GEF functionally independent from the World Bank in November
1993, finding that the Bank indeed exerted too much control over
GEF decision-making. In practice, this arrangement had sometimes
resulted in supplemental GEF funds being inappropriately granted to
recipients of large-scale World Bank development project loans.
143
Some members of the United States Congress who felt the Bank's
environmental record was faulty also supported new tripartite divi-
sions.' 4 Soon thereafter, the World Bank's governing board ap-
proved the plan to separate the two institutions. 45 Under the new
structure, the World Bank continues to serve as the repository for the
new GEF Trust Fund and proposes and oversees investment
projects.' 6 The GEF member nations also agreed that UNEP and
UNDP would retain their affiliation with the GEF and keep the same
duties, thus assuring continued U.N. input.'
47
Delegates to the GEF restructuring meetings also reassessed the
particularly sensitive issues of membership and voting rights. In re-
sponse to Agenda 21's dictate that there be a "balanced and equitable
142. Reed, supra note 92, at 207.
143. This practice has continued to exist despite the World Bank's separation from the
GEF in 1994. For example, the Philippines recently signed a loan agreement with the
World Bank under which they were also guaranteed USS30 million from the GEF. Manila
Signs $227 Million Loan with World Bank, Reuters New Service, Sept. 13. 1994, available
in LEXIS, News Library, REUFIN File. See also Division of Voting Power Remains Con-
tentious in GEF Restructuring Talks, BNA INT'L ENV'T DAILY, Sept. 28, 1993, available in
LEXIS, News Library, BNAIED File; GEF Donor Countries Agree on $2 Billion Replen-
ishment Target, BNA INT'L ENV'r DAILY, Nov. 10, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, BNAIED File.
144. Subcommittee on International Development, Fmane Trade and Monetary Policy,
104th Cong., (June 21, 1994) (statement of the Honorable John R. Kasich, Congressper-
son), available in LEXIS, Federal Documents Library;, Rep. Mike Castle, World Bank,
Under Attack, Roll Call, Mar. 27, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, ROLLCL File.
145. UNEP Governing Council Gives Green Light to Restructured Global Environment
Facility, BNA INT'L ENV'T DAILY, June 21, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
BNAIED File. This decision took place in the wake of an internal World Bank decision to
carry out environmental assessments on its own development projects. World Bank
Stresses Growing Importance of Environmental Assessment of Projects, BNA INT'L EN.VT
DAILY, Sept. 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, BNAIED File.
146. GLOBAL ENVIROI~ImNT FACILITY, supra note 76, at 2; WORLD BAN+, FACING TiE
GLOBAL ENVinoNmNr CIAULENGE, supra note 130, at 2. See World Bank Resolution
No. 94-2, cited in GLOBAL ENVIRON~mNT FACiLrrY, supra note 130, at 1.
147. UNEP Governing Council Gives Green Light to Restructured Global Environment
Facility, supra note 145. See U.N. Doc. DP/199419 and UNEP Res. ss.iv.1, both cited in
GLOBAL ENviRONMENT FACIUTrY, supra note 76, at 1.
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representation" of both donor and developing countries,148 a two-tier
double majority voting system 149 has been developed. The system
gives both industrialized countries and LDCs the right to veto new
project proposals. The thirty-two member permanent council-com-
prised of two nations from Eastern and Central Europe's "emerging
economies," fourteen developed countries, and sixteen lesser devel-
oped countries-six each from Africa and the Asia-Pacific region, and
four from the Latin America-Caribbean region' 5°-will meet quar-
terly.151 Council members serve three-year terms and the Council's
chairperson will alternate between LDC and developed country rep-
resentatives. 52 The GEF General Assembly will continue to meet
only once every three years to review general GEF policies.15 3 The
GEF will also have a Chief Executive Officer to oversee the GEF
Secretariat.' 54
The GEF also decided to eliminate its membership dues require-
ment and allow all participant countries to retain at least a portion of
their voting privileges. 55 All member states of the U.N. or any of its
specialized agencies are now eligible to participate in the GEF' 5 6
These and other changes have led to increased membership in the
GEF-as of April 1995, there were 141 participating jaations.
1 57
To ensure the efficiency of project implementation, the GEF also
instituted several administrative changes. 58 The GEF reevaluated the
following: 1) the role of the Project Preparation and Development
Facility (PDF);159 2) the links between projects and national sustaina-
ble development plans; and 3) NGO and community participation in
148. See JOHNSON, supra note 115, at 452-53; GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY, IN.
STRUMENT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RESTRUCTURED GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FA.
cILrrY 6-8 (1994).
149. JOHNSON, supra note 115, at 449.
150. GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY, supra note 76, at 3; GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
FACILITY, supra note 148, at 33-34, Annex E.
151. GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY, supra note 94, at 2.
152. Id.
153. Id
154. Id at 4.
155. JOHNSON, supra note 115, at 449.
156. GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY, supra note 148, at 7.
157. GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY, supra note 76, at 2.
158. See WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL, OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE 9.1, MAY
28, 1992. GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY, supra note 148.
159. "The PDF is a pool of GEF grant resources that countries use to help finance GEF
project identification and preparation." WORLD BANK, FACING THE GLOBAL ENVIRON.
MENT CHALLENGE, supra note 130, at 18.
[Vol. 18:771
Reforming International Environmental Institutions
projects.16° The GEF adopted: 1) new operational modalities which
require project appraisal and negotiation prior to implementation; 2)
new environmental assessments; 3) new relationship and cooperation
arrangements with the UNCED conventions; 4) new cooperation with
other international institutions; and 5) plans to implement uniform
evaluation criteria to ensure that all GEF projects are similarly evalu-
ated, regardless of which member of the three agencies has primary
responsibility for implementing the project.
161
Under pressure from NGOs, the GEF has also aspired to become
a more transparent facility with more widespread public access.
162
Many NGOs initially had great concerns about the GEF Some, feel-
ing that the World Bank was using its GEF participation to camou-
flage its well-documented environmental failures, refused to interact
with the GEF.163 Others believed that direct involvement with the
organization was the only way to ensure its accountability.
164
In response to the increasing role of NGOs in the international
environmental movement, the GEF granted NGOs "observer status,"
which gives them more direct involvement with and the opportunity
to closely monitor GEF processes. 65 Despite these changes, some
NGOs still contend that no progress has been made on the main issues
discussed at UNCED and that the GEF has failed as an institution.
166
This criticism has resulted in the successful implementation of changes
which address many significant LDC and NGO concerns. 67
Industrialized nations and lesser developed countries heavily ne-
gotiated, and continue to negotiate, a wide variety of terms of admin-
istration. Tensions remain high between the developed countries and
their poorer southern counterparts over whether the GEF should con-
160. GLOBAL Eu mouvivrar FAcmrY, supra note 94, at 1.
161. GLOBAL EvrorN Nr FAcrrY, supra note 148, at 13-15; Sand, supra note 7, at
13; World Bank, Operational Directive 9.01, Procedures for Investment Operations under
the Global Environment Facility (May 1992).
162. GLOBAL E-vimommT FAcLrTY, supra note 148, at 6; Wom BANK, supra note
59, at 111.
163. Reed, supra note 92, at 203.
164. Ia.
165. GEF, Global Environment Facility to Allow NGOs to Observe Meetings For First
lime, BNA INT'L ENV'T DArLY, June 18, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nes Library,
BNAIED File.
166. Chernobyl Shutdown, More Action on Rio Commitments, Trade Issues Likely to
Top G-7 Environmental Agenda, BNA INtL ENV'T DAILY, July 6, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, BNAIED File.
167. See eg., 2 David Reed, THE GLOBAL ENviRoNuMu.r FACiIT: SHARNO RE-
SPONSIBImrY FOR Tm BiosPwmiEs 23, 35-38 (1992).
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tinue to be the funding mechanism for international treaties. 168 Yet,
many issues are progressing toward resolution and the GEF has
proven to be a stable entity where world leaders can discuss the global
environment.169 LDCs, while still wary, have become more positive in
believing that problems with the institution may be worked out.
170
Due to the continued need and success of the facility, GEF par-
ticipants managed to drum up financial support in preparation for
existence after the pilot phase. In November 1993, the donor coun-
tries agreed to seek a US$2 billion fund replenishment. 7 1 That goal
was formally met in early 1994,172 and the GEF Trust Fund became
effective on March 16, 1995.73
The restructured facility seeks to establish the GEF "as one of the
principal mechanisms for global environment funding, to ensure a
governance that is transparent and democratic in nature, to promote
universality in its participation.., and to benefit from the evaluation
of experience with the operation of the Facility since its establish-
ment." 74 The GEF's existence as an institution specifically designed
to serve the interests of the world as a whole,'175 as well as its struc-
tural nature as a "hybrid" of the U.N. and Bretton Woods models, 76
illustrate its difference from other international environmental bodies.
While the new GEF voting structure still emphasizes consensus, it pre-
vents small minorities of countries from impeding the majority will.
The significance of this transformation cannot be overstated. It forges
a new balance with respect to international environmental funding
which promotes improvement rather than deadlock. It thus abandons
168. See generally Weiss, supra note 5; Horace Awori, Environment: Doubts Expressed
About Global Environment Facility, Inter Press Service, June 21, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, INPRES File.
169. This is not to say, however, that the current GEF institutional restructure may not
need a good deal of reform. For a comprehensive NGO perspective of needed reforms in
the GEF project cycle, and institutional and policy reforms, see David Reed, THE GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENT FAcILITY: SHARING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BIOSPHERE, Volumes 1 & 2
(1992).
170. GEF Donor Countries Agree on $2 Billion Replenishment Target, BNA INr'L
ENv'T DAILY, Nov. 10, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, BNAIED File.
171. Id.; GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FAciLrrY, supra note 148, at Annex C.
172. Agreement Reached on Funding GEF; Program to Receive More than $2 Billion,
BNA INT'L ENV'T DAILY, Mar. 21,1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, BNAIED File;
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY, supra note 76, at 1.
173. GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FAciLITY, supra note 94, at 1.
174. GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILrrY, supra note 148, at 5.
175. EI-Ashry, supra note 9, at 68.
176. Marion G. Schnerre, Reports of ASIL Programs: The Restructured Global Envi.
ronment Facility, ASIL Newsletter, June 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library.
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one of the primary mechanisms constraining meaningful agreement
on the international level and could be used in conjunction with all
international environmental treaties. However, the GEF is currently
facing perhaps its greatest hurdle. There is a danger that the United
States will discontinue its funding and participation in the facility.
IV. THE UNITED STATES AND THE MOVEMENT TO
PROTECT THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
The United States has had an unstable, cyclical role in the inter-
national environmental movement for many years.1" Due primarily
to questions of national sovereignty, domestic politics, and economic
concerns, the United States government has often been ready to par-
ticipate in discussions, but hesitant to agree to international environ-
mental accords and fund international environmental projects.
17 s
Despite its own stringent federal and state environmental legislation
and regulation, the United States has not been willing to be a full,
compromising participant in global environmental negotiations and
conferences. The same democratic principles that have allowed a
broad discussion of environmental issues in our pluralist society have
circumscribed the government's ability to ratify and enforce interna-
tional environmental accords requiring domestic enacting legislation
and funding.
179
The United States has demanded meaningful, tangible results for
the funding it provides for supragovernmental international environ-
mental organizations. More often, it demands results which somehow
benefit the United States or its interests. The GEF has not been
spared the United States quixotic attitude.
During the Bush administration, the United States did not pro-
vide any funding to the GEF Core Fund.18 However, it did supply
177. See generally David A. Wirth, A Matchmaker's Challeng" Marrying International
Law and American Environmental Law, 32 VA J. INT'L L. 377 (1992). The United States,
for instance, was the sole country (out of 130 participants) to vote against the adoption of
the World Charter for Nature. Tinker, supra note 5, at 47.
178. For example, President George Bush refused to personally attend the EARTH
Summit although more than 100 other global leaders attended. Jo-MSON, supra note 115,
at 41.
179. Michael T. Hatch, Domestic Politics and International Negotiations: The Politics of
Global Warming in the United States, 1993 THE JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT AND DVEL.-
opMrNT 1, 6.
180. World Bank: Documents Concerning the Establishment of the Global Environment
Facility, supra note 52, at 1748. US$30 million in conditional core appropriations from the
United States for FY 1993 was forwarded to U.S. AID when the GEF failed to meet con-
gressional stipulations that the GEF establish transparency and openness procedures.
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the GEF with roughly US$150 million in funding through the U.S.
Government Agency for International Development for use in grant
equivalency and joint financing projects.18' In so dobig, the United
States government retained the ultimate decision-making authority
over the specific use of pledged funds, singling itself out as the only
developed nation unwilling to put funds directly in the control of GEF
governing bodies." The attitudes of both the executive branch and
Congress toward the GEF have mirrored their idiosyncratic attitudes
toward international environmental politics in general; sometimes
U.S. global environment policy has appeared progressive and pro-en-
vironment, while at other times it has seemed uncaring and
destructive. 83
GEF Participants to Cast Ballots on Eight Projects Worth $13 million, BNA INT'L ENV'T
DAILY, Mar. 1,1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, BNAIED File. In FY 1992, US$75
million in pledged appropriations was also withheld from the GEF. Role of Global Envi-
ronment Facility to Dominate INC Talks, State Official Says, BNA IN'L ENV'T DAILY,
Mar. 18, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, BNAIED File. Beginning in 1990, the
Bush Administration proposed the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative which would cre-
ate a separate model for funding international environmental programs. See generally
Mary Weiss, The Enterprise For The Americas Initiative: An Instructive Model For Interna-
tional Funding For The Environment, 24 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 921 (1992).
181. World Bank Documents Concerning the Establishment of the Global Environment
Facility, supra note 52, at 1749.
182. Id. Of the more than 21 nations providing funds to the GEF, Japan and Switzer-
land were the only other countries to put funding in cofinancing arrangements. Unlike the
United States, each of them also made a significant contribution to the GEF Core Fund as
well. Id. The U.S. contribution was in addition to the 25% share the United States had
already promised to provide under the Montreal Protocol arrangements. Ld. The Bush Ad-
ministration, according to one insider, never made UNCED more than a slight priority.
Scott A. Hajost, The Role of the United States, in THE ENVIRONMENT AvmnR Rio, supra
note 47, at 15, 17.
183. One commentator notes that the Bush Administration approached the global
warming question by concurrently increasing international discussion of the issue and cre-
ating roadblocks to ensure that meaningful change would not occur. Hatch, supra note
179, at 15-16. For example, Bush approached the great international environmental issues
of UNCED, biodiversity and climate change, in different ways, based entirely on domestic
politics. The U.S. delegation to UNCED was the only major country that refused to sign
the biodiversity convention. They did agree, however, to sign the climite change conven-
tion. In addition, Bush's pro-environmental promises turned sour with the approach of the
1992 presidential election and its emphasis on domestic economics.
During the Bush years, the U.S. Congress's Committee on Energy and Natural Re-
sources suffocated meaningful chances for significant discussion about and improvement in
U.S. global warming policy. Interestingly, the United States isolation from international
politics based on conciliation and consensus, as in Europe, has been blamed for U.S. inabil-
ity to sign on to international environmental accords. Id. at 20-32.
TIwo Bush Administration lawyers made clear their opposition, which was at least par-
tially reflective of the Bush Administration's attitude as a whole, to creating a
supragovernmental environmental organization because they felt it would erode national
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The Clinton administration has expressed its serious concern for
and commitment to international environmental matters by placing
global environmental policy at the forefront of its international
agenda. 84 The White House has officially recognized the significance
of issues such as global warming, the greenhouse effect, forest destruc-
tion, and desertification.'85 The administration also established the
Council on Sustainable Development to study ways to implement
Agenda 21 goals at the domestic level.1s6 Finally, programs such as
the State Department's global environment protection wing, the Bu-
reau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Af-
fairs, 8 7 as well as government-NGO joint action efforts have
continued.188 The Clinton administration has noted the scientific un-
certainty associated with these issues and has decided that a "precau-
tionary" approach 8 9 towards global environmental problems should
be followed.9° President Clinton has announced the United States
commitment to meet globally established limits on greenhouse gas
emissions limits and voiced his support for the Biodiversity Conven-
tion.19' According to the administration, these agreements are benefi-
cial not only for the global environment, but also for the United
States' environmental and national security, since slowing world envi-
ronmental problems prevents political instability, refugee movement,
and armed conflict.192 More and more, it appears that multiple ratio-
sovereignty-a "bedrock principle of national self-government" they were unwilling to
forgo in any small amount. C. Boyden Gray & David B. Rivkin, Jr., A 'No Regrets' Envi-
ronmental Policy, 83 FOREIGN POL'Y 63-64 (1991).
184. See David D. Doniger, Panel 111. International Law, Global Environmentalism,
and the Future of American Environmental Policy, 21 ECOLOGY LQ. 477 (1994).
185. Id.
186. Rebecca A. Hoelting, After Rio: The Sustainable Development Concept Following
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 117-18 (1994).
187. See UNrm STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BuREAu OF OCEANS AND INrERNA-
TIONAL ENVmRoNmNTAL AND Scmrrn'Ic AFFAiRS: WHo WE ARE, WHAT WE Do, De-
partment of State Publication 10220 (1994).
188. See eg. WORLD WImDLIE FNo,, BioivERsrry SUPPORT PROGRAM PAMPHLET
(on file with the author).
189. The "precautionary principle" has been defined as a demand "that if an activity or
substance clearly carries a significant risk of environmental damage it should either not
proceed or be used, or should be adopted only at the minimum essential level and with
maximum practicable safeguards." MOSTAFA K. TOLBA ET AL., THE WORLD ENNIRON-
MENT 1972-1992: Two DECADES OF CHALLENGE 706-07 (UNEP ed. 1992).
190. Doniger, supra note 184, at 477-78.
191. Id. at 478 (citing President William J. Clinton, Climate Change Action Plan
Speech, Address at the White House, Oct. 19, 1993).
192. Id.
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nales are being used to support environmental spending in order to
assuage the concerns of less environmentally progressive government
officials.
The administration has shown its support for the work of the in-
ternational financial and environmental institutions 93 and even more
open concern with plans to begin implementing the Climate Change
Convention. 4 The Clinton administration has also proclaimed its
support for renewed and reinvigorated environmental discussion be-
tween the LDCs and the industrialized countries. 95 Its official attend-
ance at conferences held in the wake of the EARTH Summit shows its
renewed, serious interest in global environmental iSSUeS.
196
White House support has also been voiced for the GEF.1
97
Although no direct funding was provided to the Core Fund during the
pilot phase, co-financing arrangements were in place. In some in-
stances, USAID joined with the GEF and United States based inter-
national NGOs to finance projects for and transfer technologies to
LDCs. 198 Over US$400 million in funding was originaly allocated to
the GEF in the budgets for fiscal years 1994 through :1997.199
With the change in congressional majorities, however, the fund-
ing for the GEF is in serious jeopardy. The Clinton administration
proposed retaining a US$110 million GEF contribution20° in the
193. Treasury Department Undersecretary Lawrence Summers stated that the GEF "is
an important step forward. It provides a financing vehicle for investments that may not
pay off for any single country, but that pay off globally.... Clearly in the environmental
area there is an essential defensive agenda." Undersecretary Lawrence Summers, Lunch-
eon Address at a meeting sponsored by the House Banking Commit:ee to examine the
World Bank and IMF (Nov. 21, 1994) (transcript available in LEXIS, News Library,
FEDNEW File).
194. Chernobyl Shutdown, More Action on Rio Commitments, supra note 166.
195. Id.
196. United Nations, Session on Sustainable Development Given Qualified Praise for
Cooperation, BNA IN'L ENV'T DArLY, June 1, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
BNAIED File.
197. Prepared Statement of Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin, Subcommittee on For-
eign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs, House Committee on Appropria-
tions, Federal News Service, Feb. 28, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, FEDNEW
File.
198. Darryl D'Monte, Greening of India's Industry Offers Prospects, Bus. TIMES, Jan. 5,
1994, at 12, available in LEXIS, News Library, BUSDTL File.
199. Agreement Reached on Funding GEF; Program to Receive More Than $2 Billion,
BNA INrr'L ENV'T DAILY, Mar. 21,1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, BNAIED File;
Republicans Gain Control of US Congress: What Impact Will They Have on Climate and
Energy Policy?, 6 GLOBAL ENVT"L. CHANGE REPORT 25, Nov. 25,1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, BNAIED File.
200. Jim Lobe, U.S. Aid: Clinton's 1996 Budget Holds Line on Foreign Aid, Inter Press
Service, Feb. 6, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, BNAIED File.
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budget for fiscal year 1996. The State Department also recommended
continued funding of the GEF, 01 but at levels lower than those pro-
posed by the White House in 1994. Analysts warned that the Republi-
can majority in the House and Senate might put United States funding
on the economic chopping block. 2 2 In fact, the expected GET outlay
of US$110 million for both fiscal years 1995 and 1996 was reduced to
US$90 million by the Senate and to US$30 million by the House.
03
This amount, representing far less than .2% of the United States
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), does not parallel in absolute terms
the .7% of GDP goal which nations attending the EARTH Summit
promised to commit to global environmental problems0 4 It does,
however, approximate the US$400 million, .3% GDP, that Japan will
contribute to the GEF.205 Because cases of unsound environmental
funding and corruption are well documented,206 many political leaders
have voiced legitimate concerns about the use of American taxpayer
money. These politicians argue that establishing another international
institution will only create more bureaucracy in which funding will
continue to be ineffectively monitored.20 7 Executive officials counter
201. The State Department proposed US$110 Million for the GEF Testimony of Wil-
liam Christopher, Secretary of State Department of State at the House Appropriations For-
eign Operations, Export Financin& and Relate Programs Subcommittee for Fiscal Year 96
Foreign Operations Appropriations, Feb. 16, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Fed-
eral Document Clearing House, Congressional Testimony.
202. Lobe, supra note 200. Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, the Chair of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has been particularly outspoken about the large con-
tributions to international financing groups, calling them "foreign rat-holes." New Con-
gress Needs to Be Educated on Importance of Climate Change Issue, BNA INt'L EN'v'T
DAILY, Dec. 5,1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, BNAIED File. He has also criti-
cized the "muddled, vague and disturbing" provisions of the biodiversity treaty. Resolution
to Require Annual Report on Patent Protections Sent to Full Senate, BNA L-'L ENVTr
DAI.y, July 19, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, BNAIED File.
203. United States: Foreign Aid Bill Gains Final Approval, Inter Press Service, Aug. 10,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, INPRES File; GEF, House Votes to Cut Funding
for GEF Back to $30 million, BNA IN'L ENV'T DAILY, July 13, 1995, available in LEXIS,
News Library, BNAIED File.
204. Gunther Handl, Controlling Implementation of and Compliance with International
Environmental Commitments: The Rocky Road from Rio, 5 COLO. I. INt'L ENwtL. L 305,
309 (1994) (citing Agenda 21, Ch. 33.15).
205. Japan Pledges to Donate About One-Fifth of Global Environment Fund Replenish-
ment, BNA ImNL ENV'T DAILY, Jan. 28,1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, BNAIED
File.
206. See generally, Steve CoIl, The 'Big Drain' in Sub-Saharan Africa; Billions in Aid
Fail to Eradicate Ghana's Poisonous Gully, INT'L HERAL TRIB. (News Section), Aug. 17,
1994, available in LEXIS, News library, EiT File.
207. See Lobe, supra note 200.
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that continued funding benefits the United States by ensuring its eco-
nomic, national defense, and environmental interests.2
0 3
The establishment of better institutions to implement, monitor,
and enforce environmental agreements would resolve the problems
presented by both halves of the debate. Levels of bureaucracy which
burden the current system could be replaced by a single body. Trim-uing the fat from the current structure could make the entire institu-
tional framework more cost-effective and efficient. Continued U.S.
participation would also safeguard the national and international in-
terests outlined by White House officials. Accordingly, the U.S.
should continue to finance the core fund of the GEF, rather than set-
ting aside funds for time-consuming and burdensome co-financing ar-
rangements which add significantly to the workload of GEF
administrators. This would ensure the continued institutional evolu-
tion of the GEF. The GEF could then continue to act as an effective
mechanism to distribute funds to global environmental projects and
serve as a model to existing and future international institutions,
whether or not those institutions are environmentally focused. 209
V. SHORTCOMINGS OF CURRENTLY ElSTING
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
UMBRELLA INSTITUTIONS
Despite the politicalization of international environmental fund-
ing and institutional structures, few, if any, groups have suggested that
international environmental problems should go unadclressed. On a
global level, U.S. environmental treaty making has become more pro-
lific. A universal understanding that the environment should not be
treated as a purely political question has evolved with the global reali-
zation that a healthy environment ensures the prosperity of industrial-
ized countries and LDCs alike. National policies around the globe are
beginning to reflect the fact that if the ozone vanishes or global tem-
peratures rise, every individual and country will be effected. It is with
this understanding that politicians are coming to realize that the idea
of international competition is inappropriate in the field of environ-
mental law; humanity as a group will either win or it will lose. Ac-
cordingly, international organizations, governments, NGOs, and other
208. See Summers, supra note 193; Bentsen Says U.S. Must Reduce Arrears to Develop-
ment Banks or Lose Influence, 11 International Trade Reporter 421, Mar. 16, 1994, avail-
able in LEXIS, BNA Library, INTRAD File.
209. Cf. WoRU BAwN, supra note 59, at 140.
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interested parties must be proactive in forging new agreements as well
as implementing and enforcing existing accords 2 10
Unfortunately, the cumbersome and sometimes negative interac-
tion of domestic politics with international negotiations is not unique
to the United States. Instead of concentrating on the negatives, envi-
ronmental officials should focus their attentions on effectively imple-
menting existing treaties, monitoring compliance, and ensuring future
international environmental agreement. The cost of implementing en-
vironmental standards and cleaning up problem areas are significant
considerations, but they should not constitute the sole and overriding
factors in determining how to best achieve these goals. The following
factors demand that all parties cooperate on a higher level: 1) the
expanding complexity of the field-in scientific, financial, and legal
terms; 2) the expanding number of groups involved with the move-
ment; 3) the growing number of unenforced, uncoordinated agree-
ments; 4) the needless, repetitive North-South institutional conflict;
and 5) the ever-worsening state of the Earth's environment. To safe-
guard our remaining natural resources, nations must be more willing
to forgo part of their sovereignty by agreeing to resolve environmen-
tal claims before arbitration panels or to submit to the jurisdiction of
the International Court of Justice (IC]).2 11 Perhaps it is time that a
single entity act as an oversight mechanism for global environmental
issues.212
No existing entity, functioning under current institutional struc-
tures, is capable of undertaking such over-arching responsibility.
Many existing environmental institutions have proven instrumental in
helping forge new agreements, implementing individual projects, pro-
viding technical assistance, and encouraging cooperation on environ-
mental issues in the face of opposition. However, they have been
unable to act as unifying bodies to promote on-going discussion of
environmental concerns or to ensure the implementation and en-
forcement of environmental accords. Attempts to house such an insti-
tution at the United Nations, while useful for study, have not been
entirely successful.
210. See Arend, supra note 26, at 511.
211. Some organizations have suggested establishing an environmental chamber in the
ICY. Global News: International Court of the Environment Foundation, 6 IO Newsletter,
No. 2, at 2 (June 1994). See other suggestions for ADR in Barton & Carter, supra note 25,
at 553-54. Cf American Bar Association Working Group on Improving the Effectiveness
of the United Nations, Report on Improving the Effectiveness of the United Nations in Ad-
vancing the Rule of Law in the World, 29 INT'L LAw. 293, 295-96 (1995).
212. See supra part H.
1995]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
A. The United Nations Environment Program
UNEP was established in 1972 to promote international coopera-
tion in protecting the environment and to coordinate environmental
action within the United Nations.2 13 UNEP derives most of its finan-
cial support from the "Environment Fund" established by UN Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution 2997.214 Environment Fund allotments
have increased from US$30 million in the early 1970s to nearly US$60
million today.215
Since its inception, UNEP has been successful in coordinating sci-
entific data and research missions, warning of environmental threats,
creating "soft law,"'216 stimulating international agreements on a wide
range of environmental subjects,217 administering environmental trust
funds used to implement specific treaty regimes, and providing start-
up costs for specific international environmental treaties. 218 UNEP's
Montevideo Program, Parts I and I, have been more than moderately
successful in ensuring the coherent development of international envi-
ronmental law, encouraging effective implementation of existing
agreements, and coordinating states' behavior and secretariats' activi-
ties.219 UNEP's trust fund program, whose stated goal is to empower
treaty member states by creating self-supporting treaty implementa-
tion mechanisms, has also been well received.
220
The success of UNEP's groundbreaking work administering and
coordinating environmental accords, however, has been limited by in-
ternational politics, as well as by its own structure.221 It has not pro-
vided an effective legal framework to stop the spread of
environmental degradation. 2 - The world political community has
213. DOUGLAS WILLIAMS, THn SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND THE UNITED NATIONS 46
(1987); Palmer, supra note 7, at 260; Institutional and Financial Arrangements for Interna-
tional Environmental Co-operation, G.A. Res. 2997, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (no. 30) at 43,
U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972).
214. Sand, supra note 7, at 7.
215. Id.
216. "Soft Law" refers to non-binding international standards and codes promulgated
by international institutions to provide guidelines in areas where agreements have not yet
been reached. TOLBA ET AL., supra note 189, at 755.
217. See Palmer, supra note 7, at 262 nn.12-19.
218. Sand, supra note 7, at 7.
219. See Alexandre S. Timoshenko, Development and Periodic Review of Environmen-
tal Law in the 1990s: Unep Programmatic Approach, in A LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 17-
20 (Alexandre Kiss & Frangoise Burhenne-Guilmin eds., 1994).
220. Sand, supra note 7, at 9.
221. Szasz, supra note 7; Palmer, supra note 7, at 279.
222. Palmer, supra note 7, at 263.
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prevented UNEP from becoming a fully effective oversight and en-
forcement institution by failing to grant the agency any significant for-
mal powers, by severely limiting its funding, and even by locating
UNEP Headquarters in Nairobi-a great distance from most treaty
secretariats and international organizations' headquarters. 224 Com-
prised of an international group of civil servants, UNEP does not
have the requisite political power to enforce broad accords. In 1993,
the UNEP Governing Council acknowledged its own limitations when
it shifted its focus from environmental monitoring to helping develop-
ing countries use more environmentally sound technologies.35 The
Council has also reprimanded UNEP for subsidizing certain environ-
mental problem areas at the expense of others.z 6
Thus, UNEP's Montevideo and trust fund programs represent
two of its many successful initiatives which should be continued with
renewed vigor. However, the more basic questions are: 1) whether
UNEP should continue to administer such programs; 2) whether other
international environmental institutions should adopt similar pro-
grams; and 3) whether a new institution is capable of taking over these
programs and improving upon them.
B. The Committee for Sustainable Development
The group of nations which agreed to form the Committee for
Sustainable Development (CSD) at UNCED recognized the problems
associated with having prolific numbers of international environmen-
tal institutions.227 The Rio participants established the CSD to moni-
tor the implementation of Agenda 21 and to enhance international
cooperation,228 with the hope that close surveillance would ensure
223. For example, in 1994, the UNEP Fund received total funding of less than USS46
million, of which the United States provided nearly 50%. Contributions Pledged or Paid to
the Fund of the United Nations Environment Programme for 1994, as of 3O June 1994, at 37-
38, U.N. Doe. AICONF.173/2.
224. Palmer, supra note 7, at 261.
225. UNEP to Focus on 'Capacity Building' in Developing Countries, Its Council De-
cides, BNA INT'L ENV'T DAILY, June 8,1993, available in LEXIS, Nes Library, BNAIED
File.
226. For example, UNEP has been accused of focusing too heavily on the Mediterra-
nean Sea at the expense of other polluted bodies of water. Sand, supra note 7, at 8.
227. United Nations, Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED), Progress Report on Institutions, Report of the
Secretary-General of the Conference, 7, U.N. Doc. AICONF.151PC80 (July, 25,1991).
See generally Hoelting, supra note 186.
228. Agenda 21 is the blueprint for action for global sustainable development into the
21st century developed at the Rio EARTH Summit. For the text of Agenda 21, see JoHN-
soN, supra note 115, at 128. See Anthony Carroll and Jill Rhodes, ASIL UN Observers'
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that world governments would fulfill their environmental promises.229
The Committee's own internal problems and composition, however,
have impeded it from having more than rudimentary success in this
endeavor so far.
The CSD reports to the U.N. Economic and Social Council con-
cerning the on-going implementation of Agenda 21 agreements.230
Staffed with legal, financial, and scientific experts from around the
world, its importance as a forum for the exchange of ideas between
environmental officials is assured. But, the overall effectiveness of the
CSD in meeting its Agenda 21 mandate has been disappointing 31
While official government environmental ministers regularly take
part in CSD meetings, their presence has not always signified unquali-
fied support for the CSD.232 Delegates attending the infrequent meet-
ings of the CSD have noted that the institution enjoys only "modest"
success. 3 3 Some CSD representatives have even sounded negative
notes about the institution's value as an environmental spearhead.
2-
The head of the CSD has attributed the stagnation to the "atmosphere
of resignation" which followed the EARTH Summit and the concern
that world leaders would not meet the commitments to which they
agreed.235 Bureaucracy has tied up Agenda 21 implementation efforts
and national governments have consistently failed to meet their
promises.236 Some non-governmental organizations attribute this lack
of performance to the complicated reporting procedures set up by the
CSD.237
Reports: Commission on Sustainable Development, ASIL Newsletter, Mar. 1994, available
in LEXIS, News Library, INTLR File.
229. JOHNSON, supra note 115, at 128 (citing Agenda 21).
230. UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVEL.
opMENT, AGENDA 21, Ch. 38 (International Institutional Arrangements), 1 38.11, July 14,
1992. See also Agenda 21, supra note 131.
231. United Nations, U.N. Panel Opens Meeting Amid Frustration of Slow Progress
Since Rio Earth Summit, BNA INT'L ENV'T DAILY, May 18, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, BNAIED File.
232. Chernobyl Shutdown, More Action on Rio Commitments, supr2 note 166.
233. United Nations, Session on Sustainable Development Given Qualified Praise for
Cooperation, supra note 196.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See Carroll and Rhodes, supra note 228.
237. As of May 10, 1994 only 35 of the 178 countries which participated in the EARTH
Summit had submitted the required reports. United Nations, Groups Say Reporting System
on Development Needs Simplification, BNA INT'L ENV'T DAILY, May 19, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, BNAIED File.
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Much of the discussion at CSD bi-annual conferences revolves
around how to better implement Agenda 21, attract greater represen-
tation, and form the agenda for the following meetings. Meaningful
progress is rarely achieved.318 Attempts to link CSD decision-making
with the work being done under the biodiversity treaty are still at a
rudimentary stage. 39 The Committee also lacks direct representation
from world governments and is subject to the political pressure of
multilateral development banks which take part in committee meet-
ings.24 In addition, the CSD's mandate-as spelled out in Agenda
21-encompasses a vast, complicated area comprising environmental
and developmental concerns and their relation to other legal matters.
Consequently, the pace of environmental discussion has been slow. 41
The CSD's institutional parameters may have sufficient pliability
to embrace responsibility for coordinating and implementing interna-
tional environmental agreements, but only if its mandate is refocused
to narrow its short-term goals and if it can resolve its present difficul-
ties. Added responsibilities may overburden the CSD. Accordingly,
it is appropriate to discuss the possibility of creating a new interna-
tional environmental oversight mechanism and to examine current in-
stitutional practices which it could adopt to improve its chances for
survival and success.
VI. REFORMING INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES
AND STRUCTURE TO ENSURE THE
IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS
The current state of the global environment demands the estab-
lishment of an international environmental mechanism-whether by
reforming an existing body or creating an entirely new institution-to
act as an umbrella for treaty implementation, scientific collaboration,
and environmental protection coordination. Moreover, this body
could also serve as a permanent forum for the discussion of global
environmental problems. The need to establish a more efficient insti-
tution takes on special significance in light of the increasingly complex
environmental programs currently under discussion, which do not fall
238. Id.
239. UNEP Head Call Meeting Successfu" Cites Significant Progress on Many Issues,
supra note 114.
240. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 230, 29.
241. 1d.
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neatly under one treaty or into one operational category, and of the
growing concerns about LDCs' ability to effectively manage their
funding.242 In their current forms, the CSD and UNEP? are inappro-
priately structured to embrace such a task. Accordingly, this section
will focus on institutional practices and parameters which could be
employed by a new institution.
The key is to create an institution with sufficient powers to ad-
vance the cause of saving the global environment, which is capable of
creating a sense of trust between states such that rap!id, meaningful
change can be achieved, which gives a role to local communities and
NGOs, and, most importantly, which is accessible and acceptable to
both developed and developing nations. The question then arises as
to the institutional framework and mandate this new entity would
take.
A. The Palmer Model
Sir Geoffrey Palmer has suggested the formation of a new institu-
tion in the United Nations (tentatively called the "Environment Pro-
tection Council"), equivalent to a legislature, with the broad mandate
of "making the rules of international [environmental] law."21 43 He
proposes creating a new United Nations organ to act not only as a
treaty coordinator, but also as a forum from which binding decisions
regarding global environmental law and policy could emanate. 44 This
body would permit international environmental law to advance at a
more rapid pace than is available by following traditional interna-
tional law practices.
In New Zealand's judgment, the traditional response of inter-
national law, developing international legal standards in small incre-
mental steps, each of which must be subsequently ratified by all
countries, is no longer appropriate to deal with the highly complex
environmental problems of the future.... [The New Environmental
242. Joint implementation and debt-for-nature swaps are two prime examples. Joint
implementation is a mechanism under which developed countries may meet part of their
treaty "emissions standards" obligations by financing projects to reduce emissions in devel-
oping nations. Lack of Concrete Action at Talks Decried by NGOs but Backed by Industry
as Not Needed, Sept. 8, 1994, BNA Iwr'L ENV'T DAILY, available in LEXIS, News Library,
BNAIED File. For a discussion of debt-for-nature swaps, see Derek Asiedu-Akrofi, Debt-
for-Nature Swaps: Extending the Frontiers of Innovative Financing in Support of the Global
Environment, 25 INT'L LAW. 557 (1991).
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Council] would perform the function that currently falls between
the cracks in the mandates of all existing organizations. It would
have responsibility for taking coordinated decisions on sustainable
policies for global environmental protection. It would be empow-
ered to take binding decisions. And if decisions are to be binding,
the membership of the Council may need to be very wide-perhaps
including all members of the United Nations. But the key thing is
that it should have power to act-not just talk. 45
According to Palmer, failing to create an umbrella organization
would defeat the world's ability to streamline and coordinate existing
treaty obligations.246
Palmer uses the Constitution of the International Labor Organi-
zation as an institutional model for his Environmental Council.2 47 He
calls for the formation of a general conference comprised of govern-
ment delegates and representatives from business and environmental
organizations with power to create (by a two-thirds majority vote)
self-executing, binding environmental regulation.
2 48  "Politics of
shame" would, according to Palmer, be a successful way to secure
compliance with these regulations because "[flew nations like to be
regarded as international pariahs and shame as a sanction ought not to
be underestimated."24 9
While Palmer's perception of the faults of existing international
environmental institutions and treaty implementation is acute and ac-
curate, it is unlikely that developed nations would consent to the for-
mation of an international environmental organization with authority
to make binding decisions in all aspects of international environmen-
tal law. Palmer rightly recognized that the United States would prob-
ably also oppose the creation of a new international environmental
institution based on its voiced disdain for the proposition of creating
more international institutions.250 Palmer, nonetheless, believes an
environmental legislature could be formed. However, as evidenced by
U.S. congressional actions,2 1 the role of domestic political and eco-
245. Id at 279 (citing Rt. Hon. Geoffrey Palmer, General Debate Statement of New
Zealand Government, U.N. Doc. A/44/PV.15 at 61,76 (1989)).
246. Id. at 264, 279.
247. Palmer, supra note 7, at 280-81.
248. Id at 281.
249. Id. The politics of shame, or "shame compliance," probably encompasses the ex-
tra-legal consequences suffered by states which disregard binding environmental standards
and principles. See Louis HNmncN, How NAxrONs BnHvn 97-98 (1974).
250. Palmer, supra note 7, at 282.
251. See supra part IV.
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nomic concerns, which would probably prevent the United States
from approving the establishment of such a new international institu-
tion, should not be downplayed. It is doubtful such an environmental
mechanism could exist inside or outside the United Nations frame-
work without financial and political support from the United States.
252
Issues of sovereignty would very likely prevent a world environ-
mental "legislature" from being successful even if one could be estab-
lished. A majority could not impose its will upon a single nation
unless that nation was both a member of that legislative body and
accepted its decisions.2s3 The processes and difficulties of enforcing
UN General Assembly resolutions adequately display the dilemma of
balancing national sovereignty and international law formation.
Moreover, some commentators have argued that it is the general ab-
sence of legislative bodies at the global level which encourages states
to comply with international legal principles. 54 Notwithstanding
these difficulties, the idea of establishing a permanent international
environmental body staffed with government officials, with an at-
tached entity charged with implementing and enforcing existing inter-
national environmental accords, is sound.
Palmer's model also ignores the failings of the ILO structure.
The ILO has had a difficult time enforcing its own conventions. For
example, the United States has only adopted, in practice, eleven of the
170 conventions approved by the ILO since the organization's incep-
tion. 5 Attempts to enforce conventions globally when major powers
such as the United States openly disregard them would be quite diffi-
cult. As in the international labor field, environmental standards
would be difficult to enforce without the help of industrialized nations
like the United States. While "shame compliance" has proven to be
an effective enforcement provision given adequate public exposure to
the problem, overusing shame may: 1) lead states to openly disregard
environmental quandaries; 2) increase international tensions; 3) en-
courage international environmental balkanization; and 4) create legal
turmoil. To date, shame compliance has proven to be an insufficient
252. Not only does the United States provide a substantial portion of the funding for
the United Nations, at least when it pays, but it entices other governments to follow suit.
See Testimony of Warren Christopher, supra note 201.
253. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1 7.
254. See MICHAEL AXEHURsT, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTIRNATIONAL LAW 8
(1984).
255. Stephenie Overman, The ILO at 75: International Labor Organization, HR MAO.
AZIn 59, Sept. 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, ASAPIL File.
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impetus for states to consistently and conscientiously enforce their
global obligations in the ILO context.-
6
Palmer overlooks several ILO practices which would be both use-
ful and more widely acceptable in the current global political situa-
tion. First, the ILO governing body decides whether to adopt
proposals as international conventions or as recommendations.
5 7
Conventions become binding following the ratification by member
states, while recommendations are designed to be guides for national
actions rather than obligations;?5 s
The relative appropriateness of Conventions and Recommen-
dations respectively to deal with a given question depends in each
case on the subject-matter and the degree of maturity of the ques-
tion. Recommendations may be adopted, in particular, when the
complexity of the subject and wide differences in the circumstances
of different countries make it impossible to provide for a universal
and uniform mode of application of international standards, or
where this is an exploratory measure, with a view to the subsequent
embodiment of the standards in a Convention, or where a more de-
tailed Recommendation aims at supplementing a Convention
drafted in more general terms.259
A similar arrangement could be valuable for an international en-
vironmental coordination entity since states may have less difficulty
accepting and agreeing to non-binding recommendations. As with
General Assembly resolutions, which essentially have a non-binding
character,260 use of "recommendations" could lead to the establish-
ment of customary international law, whether "instant" or otherwise,
where a clear majority of states agree to a specified environmental
standard or principle and put this agreement into practice
61
The ILO Constitution further requires that all recommendations
and conventions be presented to the ratification authorities in signa-
256. See Daniel S. Ehrenberg, The Labor Link- Applying the International Trading Sys-
tem to Enforce Violations of Forced and Cild Labor, 20 YALE 3. IN'rL L. 361, 3S-89
(1995).
257. CoNsTITUTION OF THE INtERNAXIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, 15 U.N.T.S. 35,
art. 19, §1.
258. NIcHoLAs VALnCOS, THE INTERNAIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION 134-35, (S.
Schwebel ed. 1971) republished in KIRGIS, supra note 13, at 276-77.
259. Id.
260. See U.N. CHARTER, arts. 9-13.
261. Cf Jonathon L Charney, International Agreements and the Development of Cus-
tomary International Law, 61 WAsH. L. REv. 971, 971-75 (1986); B. Cheny, United Nations
Resolutions on Outer Space, reprinted in 5 Imiri , J. INT'L L 23, 2541 (1965).
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tory countries within eighteen months.26 No such procedures regu-
larly adorn environmental treaties. If states were to agree to such a
procedure, environmental conventions, once signed, could not be
readily ignored by municipal governments. Conventions would then
have a better chance of being put into effect.
In the area of agreement structure, which has proven an espe-
cially contentious issue in the GEF, the ILO has utilized denunciation
clauses.263 This mechanism allows countries which ratify ILO conven-
tions the opportunity to denounce them after the passage of a certain
number of years-usually ten.26  This process is then repeated.265
Other international organizations, such as the Organization of
American States, use denunciation clauses in their written instruments
in a slightly different way; they include provisions in conventions spec-
ifying that the agreement will remain in force indefinitely, but may be
denounced by any of the contracting states given advance notice.
266
These denunciation clauses are often effective in practice especially
when used as part of more controversial agreements.267 Denunciation
clauses have the advantage of allowing non-permanent commitments.
The ILO and OAS systems promote cooperation and voluntary com-
pliance and do not interfere with state sovereignty.
262. CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, 15 U.N.T.S. 35,
art. 19, §§ 5-8.
263. See Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration For Men ard Women Workers
For Work of Equal Value, 165 U.N.T.S. 303, I.L.O. Convention No. 100, adopted June 29,
1951 as amended in 1992 republished in KIRGIS, supra note 13, at 285.88.
264. Id. art. 3, art. 39.
265. For example, Article 39 of the Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration For
Men and Women Workers For Work of Equal Value provides that:
[a] Member which has ratified this Convention may denounce it a [ter the expira-
tion of ten years from the date on which the Convention first comes into force, by
an act communicated to the Director-General of the International Labour Office
for registration. Such denunciation shall not take effect until one year after the
date on which it is registered.... Each Member which has ratified this Conven-
tion and which does not, within the year following the expiration of the period of
ten years mentioned in the preceding paragraph, exercise the right of denuncia-
tion provided for in this Article, will be bound for another period of ten years,
and, thereafter, may denounce this Convention at the expiration of each period of
ten years under the terms provided for in this Article.
Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration For Men and Women Workers For Work of
Equal Value, supra note 263.
266. See e.g., Draft Inter-American Convention on Freedom of Expression, Informa-
tion and Investigation, OEA Doc. Ser. LIV/11.8 (Oct. 18, 1963).
267. Inspector General Guillermo Belt of the Organization of Arerican States, Ad-
dress to OAS interns at Washington, DC (June 22, 1995).
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B. Sharing Successful Institutional Practices
Putting teeth into existing environmental regulations may be
achieved by following several of the strategies put forth by UNESCO
as part of its Biosphere Reserves program.26 The Organization's
"Man and the Biosphere (MAB) International Coordinating Council"
oversees the statutory framework for the World Network of Bio-
sphere Reserves and ensures compliance with the biosphere conven-
tion's minimum standards by countries with one or more of the
world's 324 existing biosphere parks. 9 Recently, MAB instituted the
"Seville Strategy," a plan to more rigorously implement the conven-
tion's educational, sustainable development, and conservation objec-
tives.270 First, the council has threatened to remove the coveted
"biosphere" status from parks which do not meet minimum standards.
The council will also select model biosphere programs to serve as par-
adigms. Second, the council will attempt to coordinate its objectives
with the GEF in order to qualify for GEF financing. Finally,
UNESCO has struck bargains with corporate partners to engage their
help in fulfilling MAB objectives.271
Each of these strategies could be successfully employed to ensure
signatory nations' compliance with newly formed conventions and
treaties. The first strategy focuses on offering incentives-including
both short and long-term political and economic advantages-to
LDCs and developed countries to implement environmental regula-
tions. States are offered incentives to comply and denied benefits for
violations, rather than defamed through shame for failing to carry out
agreements with which they aspire to comply. In this way, the MAB
strategy parallels other "conditionality" incentive programs (i.e. tying
environmental standards to international trade agreements such as the
GATT-WTO model) without stirring up the same level of developed
country opposition. The MAB model has the added advantages of
keeping the environment as the primary interest in any agreement and
of ensuring that LDCs and developed countries approach environ-
mental agreements with more equal bargaining positions3ll While
these types of arrangements could not be applied to all treaties-and
268. Unesco Conference Approves Draft on Requirements for Biosphere Reserves, BNA




272. Cf. Charles S. Pearson, Testing the System: Gatt + PPP = ?,27 CoRN.LL IN'L. LJ.
553, 572 (1994).
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though signatory governments could shirk the incentives-the impor-
tance of environmental designations and other accolades in this era of
burgeoning environmental tourism should not be underestimated.
Praising countries that have successfully complied with environ-
mental convention requirements and nominating them as models for
other signatories to follow could encourage participation and concilia-
tion. This is particularly true if "model" countries are picked from a
broad range of members covering many different world regions, econ-
omies, and environments (e.g. one Latin American couatry, one Afri-
can country, one desert country, etc.). Countries may find it easier tomimic the success of neighboring or similarly situated nations than
those far away lands with which they have little geographic, financial,
or political relations.
lying existing conventions to global environmental financing
mechanisms such as the GEF could help ensure coordination of
projects, prevent overlap, and encourage communication between
governments, environmental agencies, international organizations,
and NGOs.
Finally, involving private industry in aiding the world environ-
ment has the potential to become an ever-important source of fund-
ing, technology transfer, and cooperation. In addtion, national
governments could provide tax incentives and other benefits to attract
corporate participation in the implementation of conventions and
other treaties, particularly those of a less contentious nature or those
with strong public support. However, if the international community
permits heavier participation by private industry, it would have to
take great measures to prevent American-style interest group politics
in the international environmental arena.
C. Inspection Panels
The newly empowered World Bank Inspection Panel, or a similar
group, could also play a role in international environmental projects.
The panel, comprised of three inspectors, is an independent forum es-
tablished for the purpose of providing "people directly and adversely
affected by a [World] Bank financed project with an independent fo-
rum through which they can request the Bank to act in accordance
with its own policies or procedures."2 73 Any group of two or more
persons in a country with a bank project may send requests for review,
273. INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE INSPEC-
TION PANEL 4-5 (1994).
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requiring minimal documentation, to the panel3 74 The panel, in turn,
will undertake a study of the problem and notify bank management of
any potential problems within three weeks275 The bank is required to
respond to the Inspection Panel's findings within twenty-one days.
76
The panel then makes a final finding and submits it to the executive
directors of the bank, with whom rests the ultimate decision z While
the Inspection Panel has not yet been heavily tested and will almost
certainly have difficulties considering its small size, the idea behind it
appears sound so long as the panel remains independent and non-su-
perficial. Establishing similar programs in current environmental
treaty regimes would aid implementation and enforcement efforts
much as individual human rights complaint procedures aid the en-
forcement of international human rights law.P7S
Moreover, ideas generated by other environmental institutions,
such as the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, which
has acted tirelessly to codify soft international environmental law and
to draft new covenants pertaining to international conservation and
sustainable development, should be considered.2 79 The import of ty-
ing environmental standards to international trade and other condi-
tionality arrangements, and of utilizing practices espoused by public
bodies such as the GATT-World Trade Organization, should also be
studied.2s0
274. Id. at 9.
275. Id. at 9-12.
276. Id. at 21.
277. Id. at 16.
278. Mark-us G. Schmidt, Individual Human Rights Complaints Procedures Based on
United Nations Treaties and the Need for Reform, 41 IN'L & COMP. L.Q. 645 (1992).
279. See Parvez Hassan, The IUCN draft International Covenant on Environment and
Development Background and Prospects, in A LAW FOR TIE ENvoNM. N 39 (Alexan-
dre Kiss & Frangoise Burhenne-Guilmin eds., 1994); INTERNATIONAL UNIoN FOR THE
CONSERVATION OF NATURE, STATUS OF MULTImATERAL TREATES IN Tm FIuw OF ENV.
RONMENT AND CONSERVATION (1993). For an overview of the IUCN's activities see the
preface to 1 NCHoLAs A. ROBINSON Eri At-, AGENDA 21 & THE UNCED PROCEEDINGS
(1992).
280. There are, of course, many other international trade agreements, some progressive
and others not, which seek to use trade mechanisms to set environmental standards and
protect resources. See, eg. NAFTA. See also Daniel C. Esty, Unpacking the "Trade and
Environment" Conflict, 5 IND. INT'L & COmp. L REv. 1259 (Summer 1994); Mark
Mininberg et al., Promoting Economic Growth and Environmental Protection" The Insti-
tute for Sustainable Development, CONN. J. OF INTL LAW (Fall 1993).
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D. Reforming Current Institutions
A new institutional atmosphere would benefit global environ-
ment discussion. A unified environmental entity could bring a spirit
of cooperation to conferences whose current norm follows tit-for-tat
negotiating procedure. Adoption of the coerced compliance doctrine
suggested by Palmer could help achieve international agreement, but
it would not necessarily help alleviate the tension between collective
government action and sovereignty.28 '
The GEF should serve as the bridge to the next step of interna-
tional environmental cooperation. 282 The GEF provides a good
model for many structural aspects of an international environmental
umbrella institution and would help achieve the generalized goals out-
lined in Chapter 12 and 13 of Agenda 21.283 It would also be a more
likely receptacle for United States funding than any presently existing
entity or any outgrowth thereof. Although principally established as a
finance mechanism, the GEF has evolved into a rough model of suc-
cessful multinational interaction. It has channelled funds into envi-
ronmental projects more rapidly than traditional mechanisms. Direct
payment to national and local organizations has allowed for quicker
implementation of GEF projects and thus more rapid and better
results.
The restructured GEF provides a more level playing field for an
international environmental law arena which has been dominated by
North-South inequities. The GEF voting structure will likely help
transform the inadequacies of international environmental law. Fur-
ther expanding the role of non-governmental organizations would also
mark a positive change for international environmental law as it
would ensure a system with transparency and frequent operational
reviews.
In addition to the reforms and ideas suggested by the ILO and
GEF models, other institutional requirements for a new environmen-
tal oversight body can be gleaned from the CSD and the UNEP. At a
281. See Yves Berthelot, Are International Institutions in Favour of the Environment, in
THE ENVIRONmENT AFTER Rio, supra note 47, at 267,275. See Rio D,.claration on Envi-
ronment and Development, Principle 2, supra note 47.
282. Cf AI-Gain, supra note 6.
283. See UNITED NATIONS, THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR ENVIRONMENT AND DE.
vELOPmENr A GUIDE To AGENDA 21 POST Rio EDrIoN 216-22 (1993). Indian Environ-
ment official Mukul Sanwal has noted that the GEF will likely be an important institution
for ameliorating international environmental cooperation and treaty implementation.
Mukul Sanwal, Sustainable Development, The Rio Declaration, and Multilateral Coopera-
tion, 4 COLO. J. INT'L EN TL. L. & POL'Y 45, 63 (1993).
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minimum, the institution should take the form of an international en-
vironmental forum-perhaps akin to the "Salzburg Initiative" drafted
in 1990-with the role of coordinating and helping to enforce interna-
tional environmental agreements. The institutions should also pro-
vide dispute resolution procedures.281 This structure allows individual
secretariats to retain their power and avoids "turf" issues which might
impede effective treaty enforcement.2s
Ideally, a framework committee comprised of governmental rep-
resentatives should meet permanently to negotiate new agreements,
and to implement and enforce existing accords using some or all of the
positive practices of the GEF, UNEP, CSD, UNESCO, and NGOs.
Secretariats should remain as implementing appendages to these orga-
nizations. The head committee should have negotiation responsibili-
ties while implementing agencies should be left to function
independently of the political players so that implementors are not
used as political tools to impose majority environmental politics. 
s 6
Treaty secretariats should be coordinated so that work is not recycled.
While environmental cooperation is imperative, treaty consolidation
will be ineffectual until environmental principles are consolidated.
Accordingly, initial focus should be placed on ensuring that interna-
tional legislators, as well as their constituents, are fully educated on
environmental issues.
A modified legislative body comprised of governmental repre-
sentatives with the power to agree to conventions on global environ-
mental issues, as well as the power to make more generalized
recommendations about environmental problems, would streamline
the existing framework.2s7 However, it would probably have to be
allotted sufficient power, using incentives and other practices, to com-
pel countries to enforce treaties which they have ratified.
If the plenary body could not meet on a permanent basis, then a
mid-sized body comprised of an equal number of LDCs and industri-
alized countries should meet, to ensure not only the consistent discus-
sion of global environmental concerns, but also to openly display its
own power and legitimacy.2 s
284. See Al-Gain, supra note 6, at 30-31.
285. See iL at 29-30.
286. Cf. Peter F. Drucker, The Age of Social Transformation, THE AmAr-nc
MOTrHLY, Nov. 1994, at 77-78.




Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
The new institution should exist separately from, but retain close
ties with, the United Nations Development and Environmental Pro-
grams, as well as the CSD.289
This type of international environmental institution or forum
would have a better chance of attracting multinational support than
currently existing institutions. Funding could be set aside in the budg-
ets of existing and newly-created treaties to establish and run the new
institution. It could pay for itself with the efficiency achieved through
the elimination of the overlapping work currently performed by sepa-
rate treaty administrations.
VII. CONCLUSION
Critics argue that a new institution could never attract enough
funding to survive and, even if it could, that it would create more un-
necessary bureaucracy which would only present a further hurdle to
international agreement. They also point out that international con-
ventions have different signatories thus making it impossible for one
entity to oversee all of them.
Arguments that international consensus cannot be reached on en-
vironmental protection arrangements and funding mechanisms ignore
the disjointed success experienced in recent decades. The number of
signed international accords attests to that achievement. The fact that
organizations such as UNEP, CSD, and GEF were established and
that the nations of the world agreed at the Rio Summit to implement
Agenda 21 shows that "the international community clearly recog-
nizes that degradation of the environment and natural resource deple-
tion not only impede economic development but also threaten human
survival."'' g
Financing will always be a challenge, but it should not itself pre-
vent efforts to reach international accord. The role of economics
should focus on drumming up funding for worthy projects rather than
preventing consideration of establishing a global fortma. It must be
acknowledged that, at this juncture, a balance must be struck between
the needs of development and those of environmental protection. Fi-
nally, the fact that the GEF operates effectively as the financial mech-
anism for several treaties shows that umbrella institutions responsible
for implementing different agreements can function successfully. The
289. UNEP's responsibility to oversee UN compliance with environmental regulations
and standards should not be disturbed.
290. EI-Ashry, supra note 9, at 68.
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details of the institutional parameters for such an arrangement could
be resolved as the institution expands and evolves.
It should be noted, of course, that full consolidation of interna-
tional treaty implementation and enforcement mechanisms might well
be out of reach so long as: 1) the world community disagrees about
the basic tenets of environmental protection and how it relates to
human development and sustainable growth, and 2) the structure of
international environmental law almost fully prohibits intrusions on
state sovereignty. For this reason, the institution proposed in this note
may still be premature. Many of the lessons learned through exami-
nation of existing institutional management could nonetheless be
shared by other international environmental institutions, including
UNEP, CSD, and regional organizations, which are becoming increas-
ingly involved in environmental implementation and enforcement.
Currently, a unique opportunity for environmental action exists.
The world community has learned that competition is inappropriate in
the field of environmental law. Agreement on reducing greenhouse
gas emissions, expanding biodiversity, and cleaning up international
waters are positive steps toward environmental improvement. In the
absence of an international environmental oversight mechanism, how-
ever, effective monitoring, implementation, and enforcement are
unlikely.
The United States government should be a full participant in this
process of creating and establishing a more equity-based, successful
North-South dialogue and ensuring the legitimacy and financial stabil-
ity of the new institution.
While initial coordination of a new international environmental
arrangement might be challenging, its overall benefits would be
enormous.
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